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CONTROLLING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:  
A TALE OF TWO INDUSTRIES
Ahmed E. Taha
Large corporate conglomerates are being formed in many 
industries.  Although a conglomerate may be able to use its multiple 
businesses to offer better products or services or lower prices, 
conglomeration can also create conflicts of interest within a corporation, 
harming consumers.  Other researchers and observers have long been 
aware of these conflicts of interest, however, this Article’s empirical 
analyses identify what specific characteristics of a conglomerate cause 
conflicts of interest to actually result in harm to consumers.  In doing so, 
the Article also guides policymakers regarding how to regulate conflicts of 
interest.
This Article examines two industries – financial services and the 
media – in which conglomeration has created similar conflicts of interest.  
Much attention is being focused on the conflicts of interest of many 
research analysts who recommend stocks for investors.  These research 
analysts work for financial conglomerates that also have investment 
banking departments.  As a result, these analysts have faced great 
pressure to write positive research reports about companies from which 
their employers seek investment banking business.  Unfortunately, this 
pressure has resulted in analysts giving biased recommendations in favor 
of these companies, harming millions of investors who rely on these 
recommendations.  In response to this bias, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, other regulatory organizations, and courts have recently 
imposed billions of dollars in fines and civil settlements and a number of 
rules and regulations on research analysts and their employers.  These 
reforms are targeted at reducing and publicly disclosing analysts’ conflict 
of interests.  
The situation of another group of professionals – movie critics 
who work for media conglomerates – is parallel to that of these research 
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analysts.  Many prominent movie critics, including Roger Ebert, now 
regularly review movies that are distributed by studios owned by the 
critics’ parent companies.  These critics can generate additional profits 
for these studios by giving positive reviews to their movies.  However, 
despite this conflict of interest, this Article’s empirical analyses find no 
systematic bias in these critics’ movie reviews.  
The difference in the behavior of research analysts and movie 
critics raises an important question:  Why do some conglomerates’ 
conflicts of interest result in biased opinions, harming consumers, while 
other conflicts of interest do not do so?  The Article finds that differences 
in the structure of the conglomerates in which research analysts and 
movie critics work and differences in the direct financial incentives they 
face are responsible for the different outcomes. This conclusion provides 
insight into what causes conflicts of interest in conglomerates to result in 
harm to consumers and how policymakers should regulate conflicts of 
interest.
INTRODUCTION
Increasing conglomeration is occurring in many industries.
Conglomerates can have synergies or operating efficiencies which allow 
the production of better goods or services or lower prices.1  However, 
conglomeration can also create conflicts of interest within a corporation, 
resulting in harm to consumers.
For example, the public spotlight has recently focused on the 
conflicts of interest faced by research analysts who work for financial 
institutions that also have investment banking departments.  Many 
investors rely on research analysts for investment advice.2 Many of these 
research analysts work for brokerage firms and write research reports 
regarding various companies for the brokerages’ clients and other 
investors.3  A research report contains facts and opinions about the 
1
 Thomas Ruffner, The Failed GE/Honeywell Merger:  The Return of Portfolio-
Effects Theory?,  52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285, 1331 (2003).
2
 Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent:  Rethinking the 
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1079 (2003) (“Investors rely on 
analyst research, in part, because they believe that analysts have both superior 
information and an incentive to convey that information to the marketplace 
accurately.”).
3
 These research analysts are called “sell side analysts.”  There are also “buy side 
analysts,” who are employed by institutions that invest money, such as mutual funds 
3                                         VOL    :    
company that is the subject of the report, and is typically accompanied by 
a recommendation regarding whether the company’s stock is a good 
investment.4
Although investors expect to receive unbiased stock 
recommendations from research analysts, these analysts often face great 
pressure to give positive recommendations of companies’ stocks to help 
their firms secure investment banking business from those companies.5  As 
a result, research analysts gave biased investment advice, causing “untold 
millions of individual investors [to lose] vast sums of money.”6 In 
response to this bias, the Securities and Exchange Commission, other 
regulatory organizations, and consent decrees approved by courts have 
recently imposed billions of dollars in fines and civil settlements and also 
a number of rules and regulations on research analysts and their 
employers.  These reforms are targeted at reducing and publicly disclosing 
analysts’ conflict of interests.  
Media conglomeration can cause similar problems.  For example, 
there is fear that news outlets that are part of conglomerates will be 
reluctant to report unflattering news – or overeager to report positive news 
– regarding their corporate parent.7  In addition, for publicity, the products 
of one of a conglomerate’s subsidiaries may be unduly featured in the 
conglomerate’s media outlets.8 This Article examines another area in 
which media conglomeration creates significant conflicts of interest:  a 
number of media conglomerates own both movie studios and media outlets 
and pension funds.  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Analyzing Analyst 
Recommendations, available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm (June 
20, 2002).  Sell-side analysts have the conflicts of interest that are the focus of this 
Article.
4
 Fisch & Sale, supra note 2, at 1040-41.
5
 David Schepp, Wall Street Analysts Under Fire, BBC News, June 14, 2001, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1387192.stm.  
6
 Testimony of NY State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer before U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism at 9 (June 26, 
2002), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/062602spitzer.pdf.
7
 Dmitri Williams, Synergy Bias:  Conglomerates and Promotion in the News, 46 J. 
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 453, 453 (2002).
8
 Allison Fass, Two Cable Networks Cooperate in a Bid to Cut Through Clutter, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at C5, available at LEXIS, News Library;  Steve Johnson, A 
Tangled Web, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 7, 2002, at C1, available at LEXIS, News 
Library; Reporters Rap Commercial Plugs in Broadcast News, O’DWYER’S PR 
SERVICES REPORT, January 1997, at 14, available at LEXIS, News Library.
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that review movies.9  As a result, many prominent movie critics now 
regularly review movies distributed by subsidiaries of the critics’ parent 
companies. 
For example, The Walt Disney Company owns Walt Disney 
Pictures and other movie studios and also owns Buena Vista Television, 
the distributor of the popular Ebert & Roeper and the Movies television 
program, which reviews movies each week.10  Also, the world’s largest 
media company, Time Warner Inc., owns movie studios such as Warner 
Brothers Pictures and magazines that review movies, including 
Entertainment Weekly, Time, and People.11  In addition, Rupert Murdoch’s 
The News Corporation Limited owns movie studios, including 20th 
Century Fox and owns media outlets, such as the New York Post that 
regularly review movies.12
Similar to users of research analysts’ stock recommendations, 
consumers use critics’ movie reviews to decide which movies to see.13
Thus the potential for bias in movie reviews is strong.  For example, the 
movie critics and editors of Entertainment Weekly understand that Time 
Warner – Entertainment Weekly’s parent company – financially benefits 
from a favorable review by Entertainment Weekly of a Warner Brothers 
film.  
This article empirically examines whether these conflicts of 
interest result in biased movie reviews.  It finds that these movie critics’ 
reviews are generally unbiased despite these conflicts of interest.  Thus, 
critics working for some of the largest corporations in the country are able 
to maintain their objectivity even when doing so hurts their parent 
9
 The Columbia Journalism Review maintains a list of the businesses owned by major 
media companies.  Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What, available at 
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/index.asp.
10
 Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What:  The Walt Disney Company, 
available at http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/disney.asp.
11
 Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What:  Time Warner, available at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/timewarner.asp.
12
 Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What:  News Corporation, available at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/newscorp.asp.
13
  People also use reviews of a movie for help in understanding the movie, to 
reinforce their own opinion of the film, and to be able to discuss the movie with other 
people more intelligently.  Bruce Austin, A Longitudinal Test of the Taste Culture and 
Elitist Hypotheses, 11 J.  POPULAR FILM & TELEVISION 157, 158 (1983). 
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companies financially.  This finding stands in stark contrast to the 
systematic bias exhibited by research analysts who issue reports on 
companies from which their employers seek investment banking business.
This finding also raises an important question:  Why do some 
conflicts of interest (like those facing research analysts in large financial 
conglomerates) result in biased opinions and harm to consumers, while 
others (like those facing movie critics in large media conglomerates) do 
not?  The Article finds that differences in the structure of the organizations 
in which movie critics and research analysts work, and differences in the 
direct financial incentives facing movie critics and research analysts are 
responsible for the different outcomes.  
This conclusion has important implications for policymakers seeking 
to control conflicts of interest.  For example, because many of the recent 
reforms directed at research analysts should create an organizational 
structure and financial incentives more like those experienced by movie 
critics, this Article provides empirical support for inferring that some of 
these reforms will significantly reduce research analysts’ bias.  This 
analysis also suggests that other of the reforms, such as those mandating 
disclosure of analysts’ conflicts of interest, are unnecessary.  Movie critics 
do not disclose their conflicts of interest, yet they do not produce biased 
reviews.  The Article’s findings indicate that policymakers interested in 
controlling particular conflicts of interest should focus on eliminating or 
reducing the conflicts of interest rather than on requiring public disclosure 
of the conflicts.  Indeed, recent research finds that requiring disclosure of 
conflicts of interest can actually be harmful to those who receive the 
disclosure.
Section I of this Article describes the organizational and incentive 
structure in which movie critics operate and the resulting conflicts of 
interest they face.  Section II discusses the organizational and incentive 
structure in which research analysts have operated, the resulting conflicts 
of interest and the bias caused by these conflicts, and how recent reforms 
attempt to address these conflicts.  The empirical assessment of whether 
movie critics’ conflicts of interest result in biased movie review decisions 
is set out in Section III.  Section IV discusses the lessons regarding 
controlling conflicts of interest that can be learned from the behavior of 
movie critics and research analysts.  Section V summarizes and concludes 
the Article.
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I. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FACING MOVIE CRITICS
Conglomeration and consolidation in the media has created 
enormous media giants that are among the world’s largest corporations.
For example, Time Warner Inc. is the world’s largest media and 
entertainment company, and ranks #32 in the Fortune 500, with revenue of 
over $42 billion in 2004.14  Among its most-well known operations is the 
internet service provider America Online, Time Warner Cable, the CNN 
cable channel, popular magazines such as Time, People, Entertainment 
Weekly, and the production and distribution of films through businesses 
including Warner Brothers Pictures.15
Similarly, The Walt Disney Company, the second largest media 
and entertainment conglomerate, had more than $30 billion in revenue in 
fiscal year 2004, and ranks #54 in the Fortune 500.16  Among its most well 
known media operations are the ABC television network, the ESPN cable 
channel, and the production and distribution of movies through studios 
including Walt Disney Pictures, Touchtone Pictures, and Miramax 
Films.17
The News Corporation Limited is an international media 
conglomerate headed by Rupert Murdoch with more than $20 billion in 
revenue in fiscal year 2004, ranking #98 in the Fortune 500.18  Among it 
businesses is the Fox Broadcasting network (including Fox News), a large 
number of newspapers and the production and distribution of movies 
through its 20th Century Fox and Fox Searchlight Pictures subsidiaries.19
The large size and scope of such conglomerates has raised many 
concerns.  For example, many fear that news outlets owned by a
14
 Time Warner’s fiscal year ends in December.  Hoovers Online, at
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?COID=102518.
15 Who Owns What:  Time Warner, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/timewarner.asp.
16
 Disney’s fiscal year ends in September.  Hoovers Online, at
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?ID=11603
17 Who Owns What:  The Walt Disney Company, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., at 
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/disney.asp.
18
 News Corporation’s fiscal year ends in June.  Hoovers Online, at
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?COID=41816.
19 Who Owns What:  News Corporation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/newscorp.asp.
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conglomerate will not fully cover stories that generate negative publicity 
for their corporate parent, and will give too much coverage to stories that 
give positive publicity to it.20 For example, ABC News may be reluctant 
to report on the newsworthy problems at The Walt Disney Company
because Disney owns ABC.  Such reluctance would decrease the quality of 
the news that viewers receive.
Indeed, other behavior of these conglomerates indicates that these 
companies use their multiple divisions in interconnected ways to 
maximize their profits.  For instance, they use their media outlets to 
promote the products and services produced by other companies within the 
conglomerate.21 For example, ABC’s Good Morning America television 
show covered Disney World’s twenty-fifth anniversary for two hours, 
which included an interview of Disney CEO Michael Eisner.22
Many media conglomerates have another way to increase their 
profits.  These conglomerates own both movie studios and major media 
outlets that review movies.  For example, The Walt Disney Company 
owns Walt Disney Pictures and other movie studios and also owns Buena 
Vista Television, the distributor of the popular Ebert & Roeper and the 
Movies television program, which each week features movie critics Roger 
Ebert and Richard Roeper reviewing movies.23 Ebert & Roeper appears 
on more than 200 television stations and is the “top-rated first-run weekly 
syndicated half-hour on television.”24
 The world’s largest media company, Time Warner Inc., owns 
movie studios such as Warner Brothers Pictures and magazines that review 
movies, including Entertainment Weekly, Time, and People.25  In addition, 
Rupert Murdoch’s The News Corporation Limited produces and 
distributes movies through its 20th Century Fox and Fox Searchlight 
20
 Dmitri Williams, Synergy bias:  conglomerates and promotion in the news, 46 J. 
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 453, 453 (2002).
21
 Fass, supra note 8, at C5; Johnson, supra note 8, at C1; O’Dwyer’s, supra note 8, at 
14.
22
 Dmitri Williams, Synergy bias:  conglomerates and promotion in the news, 46 J. 
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 453, 457 (2002).
23 Id.
24
 Movies.com, Ebert & Roeper, at http://tvplex.go.com/buenavista/ebertandroeper/
bios/ebert.html.  
25
 Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What:  Time Warner, available at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/timewarner.asp.
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Pictures subsidiaries26 and owns media outlets, such as the New York Post
newspaper, that regularly review movies.27
Because consumers use critics’ movie reviews to decide which 
movies to see,28 if the conglomerate’s media outlets give positive reviews 
of movies distributed by the conglomerate’s movie studios, then the 
studios’ profits will increase.  Thus, these movie critics face a conflict of 
interest creating the potential for bias in their movie reviews:  although 
readers of their reviews expect the critics’ sincere opinions about the 
movies, these critics can financially benefit their affiliated studios by 
giving positive reviews to movies distributed by those studios (“affiliated 
movies”).
There is much evidence that studios greatly value positive reviews.  
Most studies have found that favorable movie reviews result in more 
people seeing a movie than do unfavorable reviews.29  Even positive 
reviews from individual critics can have a significant effect on a movie’s 
success.  For example, having a movie receive a “thumbs up” from Roger 
Ebert and Richard Roeper is “worth millions to the studios.”30
Critics’ reviews can significantly impact the success of even the 
most heavily advertised films, especially if critics state that a particular 
such movie goes beyond typical expectations for movies of that genre.31
26 Who Owns What:  News Corporation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/newscorp.asp.
27
 Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What:  News Corporation, available at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/newscorp.asp.
28
  People also use reviews of a movie for help in understanding the movie, to 
reinforce their own opinion of the film, and to be able to discuss the movie with other 
people more intelligently.  Bruce Austin, A Longitudinal Test of the Taste Culture and 
Elitist Hypotheses, 11 J.  POPULAR FILM & TELEVISION 157, 158 (1983). 
29 See Suman Basuroy, Subimal Chatterjee, S. Abraham Ravid, How Critical are 
Critical Reviews? The Box Office Effects of Film Critics, Star-Power, and Budgets, 
67 J. MARKETING 103 (2003) and the studies cited therein at 107; David A. Reinstein 
& Christopher M. Snyder, The Influence of Expert Reviews on Consumer Demand for 
Experience Goods:  A Case Study of Movie Critics, J. INDUS. ECON. (forthcoming), 
Cf. S. Abraham Ravid, Information, Blockbusters, and Stars: A Study of the Film 
Industry,  72 J. BUS. 463 (1999) (finding that positive reviews do not significantly 
affect the revenue earned by a movie).  
30
 Lorenza Munoz, Credibility on the High Seas, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at F10, 
available at 2002 WL 2458178.  
31
 David Shaw, Thumbs Up or Down on Movie Critics?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1999, 
at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library.
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For example, movies including Men in Black, Saving Private Ryan, 
Scream, and The Terminator, were transformed from being “hits” to being 
“mega-hits” by critics informing moviegoers that these hit movies were 
also actually good movies.32
Also, the behavior of movie studios clearly demonstrates that 
studios believe that positive reviews are important.  Advertising for 
movies routinely contains favorable quotes from critics.  Positive
statements from well-known critics, such as Roger Ebert, are featured 
especially prominently in advertising.33  Studios also sometimes eliminate 
or delay advance screenings of a movie for critics if the studios believe 
that the movie will receive bad reviews.34
In addition, studios have misused movie reviews in advertising 
movies.  In 2001, two Sony advertising executives were suspended for 
thirty days when it was discovered that Sony had created quotes from a 
fictitious movie critic to use in advertisements for four movies of 
“questionable-quality,” The Animal, Hollow Man, A Knight’s Tale, and 
Vertical Limit.35  Many in the movie industry feared that this transgression 
32 Id.
33 See e.g., Dade Hayes, Two Thumbs Way Up!,VARIETY, Jan. 5, 2004, at 11, 
available at LEXIS, News Library (noting that Newmarket, the distributor of the 
movie Monster, which starred actress Charlize Theron, “plastered Roger Ebert’s rave 
– ‘[Charlize Theron gives o]ne of the best performances in the history of cinema’ –
all over print ads”); Richard Natale, When His Thumb Turned, Millions Got the 
Message; Responding to Movies Like a Couple of Guys at the Water Cooler, Siskel 
and Ebert Gained Power in Hollywood Marketing Circles, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 
1999, at F1, available at LEXIS, News Library (in talking about the Siskel and Ebert 
television show – the predecessor of Ebert & Roeper – the head of distribution of 
Sony Pictures states that “[i]t was always a major plus to get their approval, . . . . I 
can’t think of a case where we got two thumbs up that we didn’t use it in TV ad 
spots”).
34 See, e.g., James Sanford, James Sanford Chooses the Best and Worst Films of 
2002, at http://www.interbridge.com/jamessanford/bestof2002.html (Warner Brothers 
canceled advanced critical screenings of The Adventures of Pluto Nash due to 
concerns that the movie would receive poor reviews).  
35 Robert W. Welkos, Untruths and Consequences, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at 5, 
available at 2001 WL 2498017;  Hays, supra note 33; Emanuella Grinberg, 
Moviegoers to settle with studio after being lured by phony critic (Mar. 9, 2004), at
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/09/phony.critic/. Studios have also 
misrepresented testimonials from other sources.  Four major studios have admitted to 
using employees or actors posing as ordinary moviegoers to provide testimonials in 
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would result in governmental regulation.36  However, the Federal Trade 
Commission did not take any action against Sony, citing higher priorities 
for the agency and the disciplining effect of the bad publicity that Sony 
received from the incident.37
However, Sony did not completely escape direct punishment for its 
transgression.  Sony settled for $1.5 million a class action suit filed on 
behalf of persons who allegedly were persuaded by the phony reviews to 
see the movies.38  Also, it paid a $326,000 fine to the state of Connecticut 
for claiming that the fictitious critic worked for a local Connecticut 
newspaper.39 In addition, it paid $25,000 to the consumer protection and 
education fund of the Oregon Department of Justice to settle deceptive 
advertising charges.40
More evidence of the importance of positive reviews is that studios
sometimes misuse excerpts from even legitimate reviews.  For example, 
the advertisements for the movie Hoodlum, starring actor Laurence 
Fishburne, quoted Los Angeles Times movie critic David Turan as having 
called the movie “[I]rresistible,” when actually he had written that “[e]ven 
[Laurence Fishburne’s] incendiary performance can’t ignite Hoodlum, a 
would- be gangster epic that generates less heat than a nickel cigar. . . . 
Fishburne's Bumpy is fierce, magnetic, irresistible. . . . But even this 
advertisements for certain movies.  A studio has also constructed a phony fan web site 
for a movie.  Welkos, supra, note 35.
36
 Wayne Friedman, Sony Woes Stir Studio Concerns: Executives Fear an Invitation 
for Regulation Looms, ADVERTISING AGE, June 25, 2001, at 4.
37
 Nat Ives, The U.S. Plans to See if There is Misleading Marketing of Movies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, at C12, available at LEXIS, News Library (quoting the Federal 
Trade Commission’s Associate Director for Advertising Practices as explaining that 
“[w]e get many, many complaints about many issues, including serious health and 
safety issues, or significant monetary loss to consumers”).  
38 Lawrence Van Gelder, Arts, Briefly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at E2, available at 
LEXIS, News Library.
39
 Andrew Gumbel, Sony Penalised for Faking Film ‘Blurbs’, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Mar. 13, 2002, at 3, available at LEXIS, News Library.
40
 Media Release, State of Oregon Department of Justice, Attorney General Files 
Action Against Sony Pictures for Deceptive Advertising of Movies (Apr. 8, 2002), 
available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/rel081301.htm.  These Oregon 
charges also involved Sony’s use of employees posing as ordinary moviegoers to 
provide testimonials in advertisements for certain movies.  Id.
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actor . . . can only do so much.”41  In 2003, the Federal Trade 
Commission began reviewing its guidelines regarding how studios can use 
movie reviews to promote movies.42  These rules prevent using part of a 
review out of context to suggest that the critic gave a more positive review 
than the critic actually gave.43
There is also evidence that studios try to bias the reviews of some 
critics.  Studios have sometimes retaliated against critics who given 
particularly bad reviews about the studio’s movies. This retaliation has 
often taken the form of temporarily banning the offending critic from pre-
opening screenings of the studios movies.44
In addition, studios routinely hold press junkets in which reporters 
and movie critics are invited to attend the screening of an upcoming movie 
and to interview the movie’s stars, directors, and/or producers.45  The 
hosting studio often pays for the airfare, expensive hotel rooms, meals, and 
even spending money for some critics who attend.46  Many observers have 
expressed concern that such payments biases critics.47  They point to the 
41
 Leora Broydo, (Not Such a) Thriller!, MOTHER JONES (Nov. – Dec. 1997), 
available at http://www.motherjones.com/new/outfront/1997/11/broydo.html
42
 Nat Ives, The U.S. plans to see if there is misleading marketing of movies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, at C12, available at LEXIS, News Library; Pamela 
McClintock, FTC reviewing movie blurb guidelines, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 10, 2003, 
at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library.
43
 A Federal Trade Commission Advertising Guide warns that “any alteration in or 
quotation from the text of the review which does not fairly reflect its substance would 
be a violation of the standards . . . .” FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements 
and Testimonials in Advertising §255.0(d), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
guides/endorse.htm.
44
 Glenn Lovell, Movies and Manipulation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., 
January/February 1993, available at http://archives.cjr.org/year/97/1/movies.asp.  For 
example, even Roger Ebert and Gene Siskel were banned from screenings by 20th
Century Fox for a couple of weeks because they had spoke badly of the movie Nuns 
on the Run during their appearance on the Live with Regis and Kathie Lee television 
show.  Id.
45
 Robert W. Welkos & Rachel Abramowitz, Scathing Reviews of Junkets, L.A. 
TIMES, July 20, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 2504461.
46
 Mathew Hays, The Trouble with Junkets, MONTREAL MIRROR, June 14, 2001, 
available at http://www.montrealmirror.com/ARCHIVES/2001/061401/film1.html.
47
 Dana Kennedy, Where a Nose for News May be Out of Joint, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 
2001, at 2A, available at 2001 WL 21727468; Welkos & Abramowitz, supra note 45;  
John Horn,  NEWSWEEK, June 11, 2001, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library 
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fact that press junket attendees are often the source of the positive blurbs 
that are featured in advertising for movies that the vast majority of critics 
dislike.48  Indeed, at the junkets, studio employees sometimes have even 
tried to get critics who attend to consent to being quoted as giving a 
positive blurb that was actually written by the studio.49
In response to these concerns, a consumer group filed a lawsuit 
against ten studios that provide such junkets, claiming that the junkets 
were in essence payoffs to have the critics write positive reviews of the 
movie.50  Others have called on the Federal Trade Commission to 
investigate the propriety of these junkets.51  As a result of such concerns, 
critics from major publications generally refuse payments from studios for 
attending the junkets, and sometimes their employers do not even permit 
them to attend at all.52
(referring to the junket circuit as a “scandal” and as an “all-expenses-paid gravy train 
where the studios give journalists free rooms and meals at posh hotels and the 
reporters return the favor with puffy celebrity profiles and enthusiastic review 
blurbs”); Tom Alesia, Film’s Press Event Sends Him Reeling, WIS. ST. J., July 12, 
2002, at D1, available at LEXIS, News Library (wondering, upon seeing rave reviews 
of a movie by junket attendees, whether “the post-screening party, featuring 
boomerang-sized shrimp and filet mignon, influence[d] critics tastes?”).  
48
 Welkos & Abramowitz, supra note 45.
49 Roger Ebert, Columbia fakes it to the next level, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 5, 2001, at 
35, LEXIS, News Library (“In one [documented] case . . .  a publicist wrote up 
several ‘sample’ quotes and asked the junketeers to sign up for the ones they liked”); 
Telephone Interview with Dann Gire, President, Chicago Film Critics Association 
(April 14, 2004).
50
 The suit claimed that advertisements using quotes from junket attendees constitute 
fraudulent concealment, unfair business practices and false and misleading 
advertising, in violation of California law.  Watch out, David Manning:  
Blurbmeisters get sued (July 3, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/SHOWBIZ/
News/07/03/film.junkets.reut.  The suit has since been dismissed.  Telephone 
Interview with Anthony Sonnet, plaintiffs lead attorney (Aug. 3, 2004).  
51
 Steve Persall, This Column is Wickedly Smart! A Must-Read!, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2003, at D1, available at 2003 WL 12204651 (Claiming that 
“[f]rankly, some movie reviewers’ opinions seen in ads are purchased. . . . [Junket 
attendees who attend at the studio’s expense] know if they keep saying nice things 
and doing puff pieces, they’ll be invited back,” and calling for the Federal Trade 
Commission to investigate this phenomenon).  
52
 Kennedy, supra note 47.
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In Section III, this Article will empirically examine whether another 
source of movie reviews should also treated skeptically:  reviews from 
media outlets affiliated with the studio that distributed the movie.  Indeed, 
within the community of movie critics, there is awareness of the conflict 
of interest that critics from such media outlets face.53
Even if such bias in movie reviews exists, some observers might 
be less concerned if consumers were aware of this conflict of interest.  
Then, consumers might be skeptical of reviews from critics affiliated with 
the movie’s distributor.  However, consumers are unlikely to know that 
such a conflict of interest exists.  To be aware of such a conflict, 
consumers would have to know (1) which studio distributes the movie, (2) 
the parent company of that studio, and (3) the parent company of the 
media outlet that produced the movie review.  Although no such study of 
consumers’ knowledge could be found, the author’s personal experience is 
that, with the exception of some animated Disney movies, consumers are 
generally unaware even of which studios are involved with particular 
movies.   
Of course, this lack of consumer knowledge could be remedied if 
the media outlets that carry reviews disclose to consumers when a conflict 
of interest exists.  However, no disclosure policy exists for movie critics.  
While collecting the data for this Article, no movie review was found that 
disclosed the critic’s affiliation with the movie’s distributor.54  In addition, 
as will be discussed later in this Article, other research indicates that 
disclosure may be unhelpful and sometimes even harmful, to consumers.
Like movie critics who work for media conglomerates, research 
analysts who work for financial services conglomerates also face conflicts 
of interest that can bias their investment recommendations.  The next 
section of this Article discusses the conflicts facing these research 
analysts, how the conflicts have harmed investors, and how Congress, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the courts have attempted to 
regulate the conflicts.
53
 Telephone Interview with Dann Gire, supra note 49.
54
  In its news stories about Warner Brothers movies, CNN.com –  the website of the 
Cable News Network, which is also owned by Time Warner – discloses its conflicts 
of interest.  For example, in a news story about the casting of Warner Brothers’ 
Batman Begins movie, CNN.com warns that “Warner Bros. is a division of AOL 
Time Warner, as is CNN”.   Christian Bale to be new Batman, Sep. 12, 2003, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/SHOWBIZ/Movies/09/12/film.batman.ap/
index.html.  Strangely, however, in its reviews of Warner Brothers movies, CNN.com 
makes no such disclosure. 
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II.  CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FACING RESEARCH 
ANALYSTS
Research analysts can face significant conflicts of interest.  One 
type of conflict of interest exists when analysts own stock in the 
companies they cover.  Because an analyst’s recommendation regarding a 
stock can cause its price to rise or fall,55 the analyst has an incentive to 
recommend stocks that the analyst owns because the analyst will 
personally financially benefit from the price rise.  
Research analysts who work for the research department of a 
financial conglomerate that has both a research department and an 
investment banking department face an additional conflict of interest.  
Investors seek the research department’s sincere recommendations 
regarding the investment potential, or forecasts of the financial 
performance, of specific companies.  In addition, companies pay for 
underwriting and other services provided by the investment banking 
department.  A conflict of interest exists because a recommendation by the 
research department to investors to purchase a stock can help the research 
analyst’s firm secure investment banking business from the stock’s 
issuer.56  Research analysts’ compensation was sometimes even explicitly 
based upon the amount of investment banking business the analyst helped 
bring in.57
This conflict of interest has become more common in recent years 
as consolidation in the financial services industry has increasingly brought 
55 D. Casey Kobi, Wall Street v. Main Street:  The Regulation’s New FD and its 
Impact on Market Participants, 77 IND. L. J. 551, 583 (2002).
56
 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 3 (“Firms must compete 
with one another for investment banking business.  Favorable analyst coverage of a 
company may induce that company to hire the firm to underwrite a securities 
offering.”). 
57 Id; Randall Smith, Will Investors Benefit from Wall Street Split?, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, Dec. 23, 2002, at C1, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 103129450 (“A troubling 
pattern regulators found was that [investment] bankers and [research] analysts would 
pitch for deals as ‘a team . . . . The pitch to issuers was, ‘You’re getting us as 
investment bankers and you’re getting so-and-so as the analyst,’ and corporate 
executives could ‘meet and touch and feel’ the analysts.  It became collusive and 
there’s simply no hiding that the analysts were paid in part for bringing in the 
business, and they weren’t going to keep getting that business with negative 
ratings.’”) (quoting Mary Schapiro, NASD's Vice Chairman and President of 
Regulatory Policy and Oversight).
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research departments and investment banking departments under the same 
roof in a financial conglomerate.58  In addition, the pressures on research 
analysts that result from this conflict have increased as firms’ investment 
banking businesses have become more important; falling prices for 
brokerage services have caused investment banking profits to become a 
greater percentage of financial institutions’ income.59
Unfortunately many research analysts succumbed to this conflict 
of interest.  These analysts gave positive forecasts and recommendations 
regarding certain companies’ stocks to secure investment banking business 
from those companies.60  As a result, readers of the research analysts’ 
reports were unknowingly obtaining biased forecasts and 
recommendations,61 causing millions of “[r]egular people . . . [to lose] a 
collective fortune by relying on the tainted advice of the biggest and most 
trusted names in the world of finance.”62
On April 8, 2002, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer 
captured headlines when his office secured a court order requiring Merrill 
Lynch to provide increased disclosure of its research analysts’ conflicts of 
interest.63  The court ordered Merrill Lynch, in its public research reports 
or ratings of any company, to disclose any recent or prospective 
58
 Christine M. Bae & Carlton R. Asher, Jr., Chinese Walls – Procedures and 
Remedies for Dealing with Conflicts of Interest and Other Abuses by Broker-Dealers 
in Connection With Conduct by Their Securities Analysts, PRACTICING LAW 
INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 123, 146 
PLI Order No. B0-01A6 (Aug. 2002).
59 Id.
60
 Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of 
Underwriting Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653 (2000); Patricia M. 
Dechow, Amy P. Hutton, Richard G. Sloan, The Relation between Analysts’ 
Forecasts of Long-Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following 
Equity Offerings, 17 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1 (2000). 
61
 SEC Final Rule:  Regulation Analyst Certification (17 C.F.R. § 242 (2003)), 
available at http:/www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8193.htm (stating that the SEC is 
“particularly concerned that many investors who rely on analysts’ recommendations 
may not know, among other things, that favorable research coverage could be used to 
market the investment banking services provided by an analyst’s firm.”).  
62
 Testimony of NY State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer before U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism at 12 (June 26, 
2002), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/062602spitzer.pdf.
63
 Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch Analysts Told to Change Ways, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 9, 2002, at C1, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3391156.  
16                                         VOL    :    
investment banking relationship that it had with the subject company of 
the report or rating.64
Attorney General Spitzer’s ten-month investigation leading to the 
order found that Merrill Lynch’s research department had issued positive 
public recommendations of certain companies’ stocks to secure investment 
banking business from those companies.65  An affidavit Spitzer’s office 
filed with the Court provided documents showing that Merrill Lynch had 
publicly recommended that investors purchase a number of internet stocks 
while, at the same time, famed internet industry analyst Henry Blodget and 
other Merrill Lynch’s research analysts were privately disparaging the 
investments.  For example, in internal e-mails, Merrill’s research analysts 
were saying that some of the recommended stocks were “piece[s] of junk,” 
“piece[s] of shit,” and had underlying businesses that were “falling 
apart.”66
These revelations focused the public spotlight on how the desire 
for investment banking revenue was causing bias in research analysts’ 
reports and ratings.  However, many who were familiar with the industry 
were already aware of the problem. Academic studies had uncovered 
much evidence of bias.  For example, Michaely and Womak had found 
that stocks recommended by the underwriters’ research analysts perform 
worse than stocks recommended by unaffiliated research analysts.67  Also, 
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan had found that research analysts employed by 
the lead managers of equity offerings make more overly optimistic long-
term growth forecasts of the offering company than do other research 
analysts.68
In addition, Congress had recently held hearings to investigate the
role of research analysts in the creation -- and subsequent bursting -- of the 
64
 In addition, Merrill Lynch was ordered to disclose, in all its public research reports 
and ratings, the percentage of stocks in the subject company’s sector or industry that 
it places in each of the rating categories it used.  Id.
65
 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Merrill 
Lynch Stock Rating System Found Biased by Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest (April 
8, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b_02.html.
66Affidavit of Eric R. Dinallo in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to 
General Business Law Section 354 at 11-13 (Apr. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf.
67
 Michaely & Womack, supra note 60.
68
 Dechow et al., supra note 60.
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internet stock price bubble.69  In July 2001, then acting SEC Chair Laura 
Unger testified before a Congressional subcommittee that “there is a mood 
of skepticism about analysts’ stock recommendations.  This skepticism is 
due, in large part, to a blurring of the lines between research and 
investment banking.”70
In response to such concerns, limited steps toward investigating 
and addressing research analysts’ conflicts of interest were being taken.  
The SEC conducted on-site examinations of a number of financial 
institutions that had both investment banking departments and research 
departments.71  These examinations focused on the conflicts of interest 
that research analysts face because of their “financial interests in the 
companies they cover, reporting structures, and compensation 
arrangements.”72
Also, the Securities Industry Association – a trade organization 
composed of more than 600 securities firms -- produced a set of “Best
Practices for Research” guidelines.73  These “best practices” included 
separating research departments from investment banking departments, 
and disclosing analysts’ personal financial interests in the companies they 
covered.74  Despite these “best practices” guidelines being voluntary and 
69
 Karen Contoudis, Analyst Conflicts of Interests: Are the NASD and NYSE Rules 
Enough?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP.& FIN. L. 123, 124 (2003).
70
 Written Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and 
Their Research Analysts:  Hearings on the Quality of Wall Street Research Before the 
House Subcomm. On Capital Markets, Insurance and Gov’t Spronsored Enterprises, 
106th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Unger Testimony] (testimony of Laura S. Unger, 
Acting Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101tslu.htm.
71
 Written Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and 
Their Research Analysts:  Hearings on the Quality of Wall Street Research Before the 
House Subcomm. On Capital Markets, Insurance and Gov’t Spronsored Enterprises, 
106th Cong. (2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101tslu.htm. 
72
 Written Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and 
Their Research Analysts:  Hearings on the Quality of Wall Street Research Before the 
House Subcomm. On Capital Markets, Insurance and Gov’t Spronsored Enterprises, 
106th Cong. (2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101tslu.htm.  
73
 Information about the Securities Industry Association is available at 
http://www.sia.com/about_sia/.
74
 Kelly S. Sullivan, Comment, Serving Two Masters: Securities Analyst Liability and 
Regulation in the Face of Pervasive Conflicts of Interest, 70 UMKC L. REV. 415, 
429-30 (2001).
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unenforceable,75 some members of the Securities Industry Association 
officially adopted at least some of the guidelines.76  In addition, in July 
2001, Merrill Lynch became the first major securities firm to prohibit its 
research analysts from owning stock of companies the analysts cover.77
Following Spitzer’s suit against Merrill Lynch, more dramatic 
actions followed.  Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which in part 
gave the SEC the mandate to promulgate rules, or to direct national 
securities exchanges and associations to create rules, to address research 
analysts’ conflicts of interest.78
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act specified that these rules should focus on 
a number of areas. First, they should restrict the prepublication clearance 
or approval of research reports by persons who are not directly responsible 
for such research, and especially by persons engaged in investment 
banking.79  Second, they should prevent investment bankers from 
supervising, or determining the compensation of, research analysts.80
Third, they should prevent actual or threatened retaliation by investment 
bankers against research analysts who issue unfavorable research reports 
about a company that is a current or prospective investment banking 
client.81  Fourth, they should define periods of time around a company’s 
public offering of securities during which research analysts who work for 
brokers or dealers cannot issue research reports relating to that issuer.82
Fifth, the rules should “establish structural and institutional safeguards 
within [the firms] to assure that [research] analysts are separated by 
appropriate informational partitions within the firm from the review, 
75 Id. at 430-31 (the Securities Industry Association lacks enforcement power over its 
members). 
76
 Ray Hennessey et al., Guidelines Aim to Polish Analysts’ Image, WALL ST. J., June 
13, 2001, at C1, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2866390. 
77
 Charles Gasparino & Jeff D. Opdyke, Merrill Lynch Alters a Policy on Analysts, 
WALL ST. J., July 11, 2001, at C1, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2869178.
78
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §501, 116 Stat. 745.
79 Id. at §501(a)(1)(A).
80 Id. at §501(a)(1)(B).
81 Id. at §501(a)(1)(C).
82 Id. at §501(a)(2).
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pressure or oversight of those whose involvement in investment banking 
activities might potentially bias their judgment or supervision.”83
Sarbanes-Oxley also required the adoption of rules requiring the 
disclosure, when a research analyst issues a research report or makes a 
public appearance, of the analyst’s conflicts of interest.84  These 
disclosures must include the extent to which the analyst has investments in 
the securities of the company that is the subject of the report or 
appearance,85 whether either the analyst or the analyst’s employer has 
received compensation from the company,86 the extent to which the 
company has been a client of the analyst’s employer during the last year,87
and whether the analyst’s compensation for the research report was based 
at least partly on the analyst’s employer’s investment banking revenues.88
To satisfy these dictates of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC approved a 
number of changes to the rules of the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”).  
On May 10, 2002, the SEC approved amendments to NYSE Rules 472 
(“Communications with the Public”) and 351 (“Reporting Requirements”) 
and approved a new NASD Rule 2711 (“Research Analysts and Research 
Reports).89  In December 2002 and May 2003, the NYSE and NASD filed 
proposed amendments to their research analyst conflict of interest rules 
with the SEC.90  In July 2003, the SEC approved these additional changes 
83 Id. at §501(a)(3).  The statute also allows the SEC or association or exchange to 
“address such other issues as the Commission, or such association or exchange, 
determines appropriate.”  Id. at §501(a)(4).  
84 Id. at §501(b).
85 Id. at §501(b)(1).
86 Id. at §501(b)(2).
87 Id. at §501(b)(3).
88 Id. at §501(b)(4).  The statute also requires that the SEC or the association or 
exchange mandate disclosure of any other “material” conflicts of interest that it deems 
appropriate.  Id. at §501(b)(5).  
89
 SR-NYSE-2002-09, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 45908 (May 10, 2002).
90
 Samuel Winer, Amy N. Kroll, Adam J. Eisner, Recent SRO Rules Regarding 
Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest 203, 205 (ALI - ABA Continuing Legal 
Education) (Jan. 8-9, 2004), available in WESTLAW at SK057 ALI-ABA 203.
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as well.91  In the same month, the NYSE and NASD filed additional 
proposed amendments to their rules, which the SEC also approved.92
These rules and regulations can be grouped into three broad 
categories:  (1) those designed to make research analysts independent, 
especially from their firms’ investment bankers; (2) those designed to 
prevent research analysts from having a personal financial stake in the 
effect of their coverage on the companies they cover; and (3) those 
requiring public disclosure of research analysts’ conflicts of interests.  
Several of these rules are aimed at ensuring that research analysts 
work independently, especially from their firm’s investment bankers.  For 
example, NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 mandate that research 
analysts may not be “subject to the supervision or control” of an employee 
of the investment banking department.93  Also, no one involved with 
investment banking activities may “directly or indirectly, retaliate against 
or threaten to retaliate against” a research analyst who makes an 
unfavorable research report or public appearance that might adversely 
affect the firm’s current or potential investment banking relationship with 
the subject company.94  In addition, except to verify the accuracy of facts 
in the report or to identify a potential conflict of interest, non-research 
personnel may not review a research report before its publication.95  Also, 
research analysts are forbidden to participate in the solicitation of 
investment banking business.96
To assure their independence, research analysts’ communications 
with the companies they cover are also restricted.  Except to verify its 
factual accuracy, the subject of a research report may not be sent a copy of 
the report before its publication.97  In addition, the subject company cannot 
be given significant advance notice of a research analyst’s intent to change 




 NASD Rule 2711(b)(1) and NYSE Rule 472(b)(1).
94
 NASD Rule 2711(j) and NYSE Rule 472(g)(2).
95
 NASD Rule 2711(b)(2)-(3) and NYSE Rule 472(b)(2)-(3).
96
 NASD Rule 2711(c)(4) and NYSE Rule 472(b)(5).
97
 NASD Rule 2711(c)(1)-(2) and NYSE Rule 472(c)(4).
98
 NASD Rule 2711(c)(3) and NYSE Rule 472(c)(4)(iii).
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Other of the rules prohibit firms from promising favorable 
coverage of a company in exchange for compensation or that company’s 
investment banking business. Research analysts are generally forbidden 
from publishing or distributing research reports, and from making public 
appearances, regarding a company soon after the analyst’s firm was a 
manager or co-manager of a securities offering by that company.99  There 
is a similar prohibition for a period after an initial public offering in which 
the analyst’s company participates, or agrees to participate, as an 
underwriter or dealer.100  In addition, if coverage of a company is 
terminated, the firm must give notice of this termination and generally 
must produce a final research report on the company.101
Other rules are directly focused on preventing research analysts 
from having a financial incentive to help the investment banking 
department.  Research analysts cannot receive any compensation based 
upon a specific investment banking services transaction.102  In addition, 
the committee that approves analysts’ compensation cannot have a 
representative of the investment banking department.103  Also, the 
analyst’s contribution to the firm’s investment banking business, and the 
views of the firm’s investment banking department regarding the analyst, 
cannot be a factor in the analyst’s compensation.104
To prevent analysts from having a personal financial interest in 
how their reports affect the securities prices of the companies they cover, 
restrictions are also put on research analysts’ personal trading of securities.  
For example, an analyst is prohibited in general from buying or selling any 
security of a company around the time that the analyst’s firm publishes a 
research report on the company or changes the rating or price target of the 
company’s securities.105  In addition, a research analyst may not acquire a 
99
 NASD Rule 2711(f)(1) and NYSE Rule 472(f)(1)-(2).  An exception is made for 
reports and public appearances concerning significant events that happen to the 
company.  NASD Rule 2711(f)(1)(B)(i) and NYSE Rule 472(f)(5).
100
 NASD Rule 2711(f)(2) and NYSE Rule 472(f)(3).  
101
 NASD Rule 2711(f)(5) and NYSE Rule 472(f)(6).   
102
 NASD Rule 2711(d)(1) and NYSE Rule 472(h)(1).    
103
 NASD Rule 2711(d)(2) and NYSE Rule 472(h)(2). 
104
 NASD Rule 2711(d)(2) and NYSE Rule 472(h)(2).
105
 Such purchases are prohibited from 30 days before the report or change in rating or 
price target is issued until five days after its issuance.  An exception exists for 
transactions in the 30 days preceding the issuance of a report or rating or price change 
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company’s securities before its initial public offering if the issuer is 
“principally engaged in the same types of business” as companies that the 
research analyst follows.106  Also, in general, a research analyst may not 
transact in any security in a manner inconsistent with the analyst’s most 
recently published report regarding the issuer.107  For example, in general, 
an analyst may not sell a stock if the analyst’s most recent report 
recommends that investors purchase the stock.  Furthermore, legal or 
compliance personnel of the research analyst’s employer must pre-approve 
any transactions by persons who oversee research analysts if the 
transactions are of equity securities of a company covered by those 
analysts.108
The last type of new rule requires disclosure of a research analyst’s 
conflicts of interest.  These disclosures must be “clear, comprehensive, 
and prominent.”109 Some of the rules require the disclosure of the analyst’s 
personal financial interest in the subject company or in the analyst’s firm’s 
investment banking revenues.  They require in research reports110 the 
disclosure of the existence and nature of any financial interest the analyst 
or a member of the analyst’s household has in the securities of the subject 
company;111 whether the analyst or a member of the analyst’s household is 
a director, officer, or advisory board member of the subject company;112
and any other “actual, material conflict of interest” of the analyst or the 
analyst’s firm.113  In addition, research reports must disclose if the analyst 
made in response to significant news regarding the company.  NASD Rule 2711(g)(2) 
and NYSE Rule 472(e)(2).
106
 NASD Rule 2711(g)(1) and NYSE Rule 472(e)(1).
107
 NASD Rule 2711(g)(3) and NYSE Rule 472(e)(3).  
108
 NASD Rule 2711(g)(6) and NYSE Rule 472(e)(5).  
109
 NASD Rule 2711(h)(10) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1).  In addition, the disclosures 
either must be on the front page of the research report, or the front page of the report 
must refer to the page where the disclosures are located.  Id.
110
 The disclosure requirements for public appearances by research analysts are 
similar to the disclosure requirements for research reports.
111
 NASD Rule 2711(h)(1)(A) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(iii)(b).
112
 NASD Rule 2711(h)(3) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(iii)(c).
113
 NASD Rule 2711(h)(1)(C) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(iii)(d).
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has received compensation based on the analyst’s firm’s investment 
banking revenues or from the subject company of the report.114
The analyst’s firm’s business with the subject company must also 
be disclosed.  Generally, disclosure is required of whether the analyst’s 
firm has recently managed or co-managed a public offering of the subject 
company, or if the firm or an affiliate of the firm has recently received or 
expects to soon receive or seek compensation from the subject company 
for investment banking and/or other services and products.115  It must also 
be disclosed if the firm is making a market in the subject company’s 
securities.116
Finally, information related to the rating system the analyst uses to 
rate securities must also be disclosed in the research reports.  Each rating 
used in the rating system – such as “Strong Buy”, “Neutral”, and “Sell” –
must be defined.117  Also, these definitions must be “consistent with [the 
ratings’] plain meaning.”118  Second, the report must provide information 
about the distribution of ratings given by all the employer’s analysts.  
Specifically, it must state both the percentage of covered companies, and 
the percentage of covered companies for which the employer has recently 
provided investment banking services, that would receive “Buy,” 
“Hold/Neutral,” or “Sell” rating  (even if the analyst uses a different rating 
system).119  The report also must contain a graph that displays the 
security’s past daily closing prices and the analyst’s rating and price target 
changes.120
In addition to approving these changes in the rules of the NYSE 
and NASD, the SEC adopted Regulation Analyst Certification 
114
 NASD Rule 2711(h)(2)(A)(i) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(ii)(a).
115
 NASD Rule 2711(h)(2)(A)(ii) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(i)(a).
116
 NASD Rule 2711(h)(8) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(i)(b).
117
 NASD Rule 2711(h)(4) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(f).
118
 NASD Rule 2711(h)(4) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(f).
119
 NASD Rule 2711(h)(5)(A)-(B) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(g).
120
 NASD Rule 2711(h)(6) and NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(h).  This requirement only 
exists for securities that have been rated for at least one year.  The graph must contain 
data for the lesser of three years or the period for which the company has been rated.  
Id.
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(“Regulation AC”), which also required certain disclosures.121  Regulation 
AC requires that research reports disclose whether the analyst received any 
payments in connection with the specific recommendations or views 
expressed in the report.122  The research analyst must also certify that the 
views expressed in the report accurately reflect the analyst’s own views.123
In addition to these rule and regulation changes, a number of 
lawsuits were filed in response to research analysts’ bias.  First, a number 
of private suits have sought damages on behalf of investors who allegedly 
lost money by relying on biased research reports.124  Also, as discussed 
above, on April 28, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
New York Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities 
Dealers, the North American Securities Administrators Association, the 
New York Attorney General, and state securities regulators brought and 
settled joint enforcement actions against ten large securities firms and two 
individuals.125  These actions alleged that all the firms had “supervisory 
deficiencies” and “engaged in acts and practices that created or maintained 
inappropriate influence by investment banking over research analysts, 
thereby imposing conflicts of interest on research analysts that the firms 
failed to manage in an adequate or appropriate manner.”126
As part of the global settlement, the firms paid a total of $1.4 
billion in fines, disgorgement, and the funding of independent research and 
121
 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Amends Definition of 
“Dealer” for Banks, Adopts Analyst Certification Rule (Feb. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-21.html.
122
 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(2) (2003).
123
 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(1) (2003).  Similar disclosure requirements exist for views 
expressed in public appearances by an analyst.  17 C.F.R. § 242.502 (2003).  
124 Margo McCall, NY Probe Spurs New Brand of Lawsuit, WIRELESS WEEK, July 22, 
2002, available at http://www.wirelessweek.com/article/CA234275?spacedesc= 
Business%2FFinance&st t=001.
125
 Joint Press Release, SEC, New York Attorney General, North American Securities 
Administrators Association, NASD, NYSE, and state securities regulators, Ten of 
Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of 
Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Joint 
Press Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.  
126 Id.  Other charges specific to particular firms were also made.  Id.
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investor education.127  Other terms of the settlement agreement required 
structural changes in the firms to increase their research analysts’ 
independence from their investment bankers.  These changes are 
consistent with the recently adopted SEC, NYSE, and NASD rules and 
regulations discussed above.  Among the most important changes is the 
creation of firewalls and physical separation between research and 
investment banking departments of the firms, including prohibiting 
research analysts from participating in the solicitation of investment 
banking business.128  Also, the firms’ investment bankers are prevented 
from having input into the determination of the research departments’ 
budgets.129  In addition, the investment bankers are prohibited from 
evaluating research analysts’ performance and from having even indirect 
input into research analysts’ compensation.130  Also, research analysts’ 
compensation cannot be even indirectly based on the firms’ investment 
banking revenues.131
The global settlement also imposed a disclosure requirement.  The 
ten firms must make publicly available historical information on the 
ratings and stock price target forecasts their research analysts gave.132
This disclosure is intended to “enable investors to evaluate and compare 
the performance of analysts.”133
In summary, the combination of the reforms imposed by the SEC, 
NASD, NYSE, and the global settlement are causing significant changes 
in the industry.  However, the rationale for these reforms are based upon 
assumptions regarding what causes bias in research reports and harm to 
investors:  (1) research analysts lacking independence, (2) research 
analysts having personal financial stakes in how their reports affect the 
prices of the securities of the subjects of their reports, and (3) insufficient 
127
 This was composed of $475.5 million in fines, $387.5 million in disgorgement, 







 SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, NASD, NYSE, and state 
securities regulators (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/factsheet.htm.  
133
 Joint Press Release, supra note 125. 
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disclosure of analysts’ conflicts of interest. This article empirically 
examines the experience of movie critics, who face a situation similar to 
those facing research analysts, for evidence of whether these assumptions 
are correct, and thus whether these reforms are likely to actually reduce
analysts’ bias.  
III.  TESTING FOR BIAS IN MOVIE REVIEWS
This Article empirically examines whether there is bias in the 
movie reviews of media outlets affiliated with movie studios.  To do this, 
the Article examines three media conglomerates that own movie studios 
and own media outlets that review movies:  The Walt Disney Company, 
Time Warner Inc., and The News Corporation Limited.  The first part of 
this section describes the data used in this study.  The second part of this 
section describes the empirical methodology used to test for bias and 
presents the results of this analysis.
A.  Data
The media outlets, movie critics, and movie studios involved in 
this study are summarized in Table 1.  The Walt Disney Company is the 
world’s second largest media and entertainment conglomerate with more 
than $30 billion in revenue in fiscal year 2004.134  Among its operations is 
the production and distribution of films through businesses including Walt 
Disney Pictures, Touchtone Pictures, and Miramax Films.135  It also owns 
Buena Vista Television, which distributes the popular Ebert & Roeper and 
the Movies (“Ebert & Roeper”) television show, which each week features 
movie critics Roger Ebert and Richard Roeper reviewing movies.136 Ebert 
& Roeper appears on more than 200 television stations and is the “top-
rated first-run weekly syndicated half-hour on television.”137
134
 Disney’s fiscal year ends in September.  Hoovers Online, at
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?ID=11603




 Movies.com, Ebert & Roeper, at http://tvplex.go.com/buenavista/ebertandroeper/
bios/ebert.html.  
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TABLE 1
Movie Studio Ownership 
Time Warner Inc. is the world’s largest media and entertainment 
company with revenue of over $42 billion in 2004.138  Among its 
operations is the production and distribution of films through businesses 
including Warner Brothers Pictures, New Line Cinema, and Fine Line 
Features.139  It also owns numerous print and broadcast news outlets that 
carry movie reviews, including Entertainment Weekly magazine, CNN, 
Time magazine , and People magazine.140  However, limits on the 
138
 Time Warner’s fiscal year ends in December.  Hoovers Online, at
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?COID=102518.









Ebert & Roeper Roger Ebert Walt Disney Co. Walt Disney Pictures





Entertainment Weekly  Owen Glieberman Time Warner Inc. Warner Bros. Pictues
Lisa Schwarzbaum New Line Cinema
Fine Line Features
New York Post Jonathan Foreman News Corp. Ltd. 20
th Century Fox
Lou Lumenick Fox Searchlight 
Pictures
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availability of data restrict this Article to analyzing Entertainment 
Weekly’s movie reviews.  
Entertainment Weekly is a weekly national magazine focusing on 
the entertainment industry and has a paid circulation of almost 1.8 
million.141  In addition to reporting movie reviews made by certain outside 
reviewers, it also carries the reviews of its own staff of reviewers.  During 
the time period encompassed by this study, five critics reviewed movies 
for Entertainment Weekly itself, however, two of them – Owen 
Gleiberman and Lisa Schwarzbaum  -- accounted for more than ninety 
percent of the reviews.
The News Corporation Limited is an international media 
conglomerate headed by Rupert Murdoch with more than $20 billion in 
revenue in fiscal year 2004.142  Among it businesses is the production and 
distribution of movies through its 20th Century Fox and Fox Searchlight 
Pictures subsidiaries.143  In addition, it owns numerous print and broadcast 
news outlets, including the New York Post.144
The New York Post, a daily newspaper with a circulation of 
approximately 620,000,145 regularly prints movie reviews by its critics.  
During the time period encompassed by this study, five critics reviewed 
movies for the New York Post, however, two of them – Jonathan Foreman 
and Lou Lumenick – accounted for more than ninety-five percent of the 
reviews.146
To test whether bias exists in media conglomerates’ movie 
reviews, this paper empirically examines whether Ebert & Roeper’s
141
 Jenna Schnuer, Time’s tactics show a way out, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 15, 2004, 
at S-6,  available at LEXIS, News Library.
142
 News Corporation’s fiscal year ends in June.  Hoovers Online, at
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?COID=41816.
143 Who Owns What:  News Corporation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., at
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/newscorp.asp.
144 Id.
145 Jon Fine, Inside the NYC Tabloid Wars: ‘Post’ Gains Circulation; ‘Daily News’ 
Plans Major Changes, AD AGE, Oct. 13, 2003, available at 
http://www.adage.com/news.coms?newsID-38934.
146 The News Corporation Limited also owns many local television stations in the 
United States, some of which broadcast movie reviews occasionally as part of their 
news broadcasts. Who Owns What:  News Corporation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
at http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/newscorp.asp.  However, access to these reviews 
is unavailable so they are not included in this study.
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reviews are biased in favor of Disney movies, whether Entertainment 
Weekly’s reviews are biased in favor of Time Warner movies, and whether 
the New York Post’s reviews are biased in favor of News Corporation 
movies.  
This paper uses the 1,082 movies that appeared in the “Crix Picks” 
section of Variety magazine and opened in the United States from January 
1, 2000, through March 31, 2003.  Variety magazine is sometimes referred 
to as the “bible” of the show business industry and is not affiliated with 
any movie studio.147  Each week, Variety’s Crix Picks section tabulates 
movie reviews from many of the best-known movie critics in the United 
States148 for approximately six movies opening that week.149  These 
movies include at least the two largest “blockbusters” and at least one 
smaller “niche” movie released that week.150  Although there are over 100 
critics in the pool from which Variety collects reviews,151 the number of 
reviews compiled for any particular movie is much less.  For the movies 
used in this Article, Variety collected between one and fifty-one reviews, 
with an average of seventeen.  The number of reviews varies because the 
number of critics who review a movie differ; significant films from major 
studios are generally reviewed by more critics than are smaller “niche” 
films.152  Crix Picks includes all reviews that its pool of critics sends to 
Variety, and occasionally Variety will solicit reviews from critics who 
have not sent their reviews to Variety in some time.153
Each review collected by Crix Picks is labeled as giving the movie 
a favorable review (“Pro”), an unfavorable review (“Con”), or a mixed 
review (“Mixed”).  The vast majority of the reviewers designate for Crix 
147 See, e.g., Anthony DeBarros & Susan Wloszczyna, Movie critics, fans follow 
surprisingly similar script, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WL 
58552118.
148
 It also compiles reviews from many British critics, however those reviews are not 
used in this study.
149 On rare occasions, Crix Picks is not published in a particular week, however, 
typically the next Crix Picks’ is expanded to also cover movies released during that 
skipped week. Telephone Interview with Jill Feiwell, Assistant Editor, Variety, who 
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Picks which category their review is in.154  For the few critics who do not 
choose a category, Variety’s editorial staff reads the reviews and makes 
the designation.155
B.  Empirical Methodology and Results
Bias in favor of an affiliated studio’s movies can take two forms.  
First, bias might exist in the selection of which movies a critic reviews.  
Second, bias could exist in the grades a reviewer gives to affiliated 
studios’ movies.  This article tests for both forms of bias.
1.  Bias in the Selection of Movies to Review
 Bias in the selection of which movies are reviewed may also take 
one of two forms.  A media outlet may be more likely to review an 
affiliated studio’s films to increase publicity for those films.  On the other 
hand, the media outlet might be more likely to review good films from that 
studio, but less likely to review bad films from that studio to avoid adding 
to negative publicity regarding the bad movies.  This would allow a critic 
who wants to give sincere reviews to still be more likely to give positive 
reviews, and less likely to give negative reviews, to affiliated films than do 
other critics.  
Table 2 presents the number and percentage of movies listed in 
Variety’s Crix Pix – broken down by the parent company of the 
distributing studio – that were reviewed by each media outlet.  It shows 
that critics are no more likely to review movies distributed by an affiliated 
studio than movies distributed by an unaffiliated studio.  In fact, Disney-
owned Ebert & Roeper reviewed a smaller percentage of the Disney-
distributed movies (78.8%) than of the Time Warner (84.6%) or the News 
Corporation movies (87.5%).  Similarly, Entertainment Weekly, which is 
owned by Time Warner was no more likely to review the Time Warner 
movies (95.9%) than the Disney movies (96.6%) or the News Corporation 
movies (96.4%) and the New York Post was no more likely to review the 
News Corporation movies (100%) than Time Warner (100%) or Disney 
movies (99.2%). Indeed, there is no statistically significant difference 
between the percentage of affiliated movies and the percentage of 




 The null hypothesis tested is that the percentage of movies reviewed is 
independent of the parent company of the movies’ distributor.  As noted in Table 2, 
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TABLE 2
Percentage of Movies Reviewed
Chi-squared = 4.06, Degrees of freedom=10   (Not Statistically Significant)
As noted above, bias in the selection of movies to review may 
instead take the form of choosing to review higher quality movies from 
affiliated studios than from unaffiliated studios.  To test for this form of 
bias, Table 3 displays the average quality of the movies reviewed by each 
media outlet, broken down by the distributing studio.  The quality of a 
particular movie is measured as the average grade, as reported in Variety’s 
Crix Pics, that the movie receives from critics with no affiliation to the 
studio that distributed the movie.  Thus, a movie’s “quality” is calculated 
as the number of favorable reviews minus the number of unfavorable 
this null hypothesis cannot be rejected because the chi square statistic is only 4.06, 


















New York Post News Corp.
99.2% 100.0% 100.0%
(1014 movies reviewed)
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reviews, divided by the total number of reviews.  For example, if a movie 
had eight favorable reviews, three unfavorable reviews, and nine mixed 
reviews, the movie’s “quality” would be 0.25.157  “Quality” ranges from -1 
for a movie with only unfavorable reviews to +1 for a movie with only 
favorable reviews; the quality of a movie with an equal number of 
favorable and unfavorable reviews would be 0.
TABLE 3
Average Quality of Movies Reviewed
As shown in Table 3, critics do not review better affiliated movies 
than unaffiliated movies.  Although the average Disney movie reviewed 
by Ebert & Roeper  is higher quality (.1710) than the average Time Warner 
(-.0588) or News Corporation movie (.0916) it reviews, that appears to be 
157
 (8 favorable reviews – 3 unfavorable reviews) / (8 favorable reviews + 3 
unfavorable reviews + 9 mixed reviews) = 0.25.  Note that this methodology is 
identical to calculating the value of average review where a favorable review has a 







Ebert & Roeper Disney .1710 -.0588 .0916






(114 movies) (118 movies) (54 movies)
New York Post News Corp.
.1283 -.0792 .0132
(117 movies) (123 movies) (56 movies)
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due to the fact that the average Disney movie made was of higher quality, 
not because of a bias by Ebert & Roeper in favor of Disney movies.  
Indeed, the average Disney movie reviewed by Entertainment Weekly and 
the New York Post were also higher quality than the average Time Warner 
or News Corporation movie that those publications reviewed.  
Ebert & Roeper reviewed fewer movies (612 movies) than 
Entertainment Weekly (776 movies), which reviewed fewer movies than 
the New York Post (1014 movies).  It appears that the outlets that reviewed 
fewer movies often chose not to review lower quality movies, regardless 
of who the distributor was.  For each distributor, the average quality of 
movie reviewed by Ebert & Roeper was higher than the average quality of 
movie reviewed by Entertainment Weekly, which was higher than the 
average quality of movie reviewed by the New York Post.  Thus, although 
Ebert & Roeper and Entertainment Weekly were more likely to review 
higher quality movies than lower quality movies, this decision was 
independent of which studio distributed the movie.  For example, the 
difference between the average quality of Disney and News Corporation 
movies reviewed was not more for Ebert & Roeper (.0794)158 than it was 
for the New York Post (.1151).159  If there was bias in the selection of 
movies to review, Ebert & Roeper should exhibit a bigger gap in the 
quality of Disney and News Corporation movies it reviews than does the 
New York Post.  Indeed, an examination of Table 3 demonstrates that, 
relative to the other media outlets, none of the media outlets discriminated 
in favor of higher quality affiliated movies.
Thus, Tables 2 and 3 provide support for the conclusion that there 
is no bias in the selection of which movies are reviewed.  However, 
additional analysis is necessary to control for other factors that may be 
preventing the detection of bias.  Thus, a multiple regression analysis is 
used in which number of quantifiable, explanatory variables are examined 
that may affect the probability that a particular movie is reviewed.  The 
definitions of these variables are summarized in Table 4.
158
 As displayed in Table 3, for Ebert & Roeper, the average quality of Disney movies 
reviewed was .1710, and the average quality of News Corporation movies was .0916.  
Thus, there was a .0794 difference in the average quality of Disney and News 
Corporation movies reviewed.  
159
 As displayed in Table 3, for the New York Post, the average quality of Disney 
movies reviewed was .1283, and the average quality of News Corporation movies was 
.0132.  Thus there was a .1151 difference in the average quality of Disney and News 
Corporation movies reviewed.  
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TABLE 4




 #_REVIEWS Number of reviews of movie by unaffiliated 
reviewers 
NICHE Movie distributed by a “niche” studio (1=yes, 
0=no)
AFFILIATE Movie is affiliated with the critic (1=yes, 0=no)
QUALITY Average grade given to movie by unaffiliated 
critics
AFFILIATE*QUALITY Interaction term of AFFILIATE and QUALITY 
variables (AFFILIATE multiplied by QUALITY)
Dependent Variables
REVIEW Movie reviewed by particular media outlet 
(1=yes, 0=no)
GRADE Grade given to movie by the critic
Number of Unaffiliated Reviews
The first explanatory variable, #_REVIEWS, is the number of 
reviews reported in Variety’s Crix Picks by reviewers with no affiliation to 
the studio that distributed the movie.  Specifically, it excludes reviews in 
Disney media outlets of Disney studios’ films, reviews in Time Warner 
media outlets of films distributed by Time Warner studios, and reviews in 
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News Corporation media outlets of films distributed by News Corporation 
studios.
Many of the same factors that lead unaffiliated critics to review a 
movie – pre-release publicity, etc. – should also cause affiliated critics to 
review it.  Thus, all else equal, the more unaffiliated reviewers who 
reviewed a certain movie, the more likely that a particular affiliated 
reviewer should have reviewed it also.  
Niche Studio Movie
NICHE is a dummy variable that denotes whether the film is 
distributed by a niche movie studio.  NICHE has a value of 1 if the film 
was distributed by a niche studio, and a value of 0 if it was distributed 
instead by a major studio.160  Films from major studios tend to be higher 
profile, have more pre-release publicity, and have wider intended 
audiences. Thus, mass-market media outlets, such as Ebert & Roeper, 
Entertainment Weekly, and the New York Post, may be less likely to 
review movies from niche studios than are other media outlets.
Affiliated Movie
AFFILIATE is a dummy variable that denotes whether the movie 
is distributed by a studio affiliated with the media outlet in which the 
review appears.  AFFILIATE has a value of 1 if a movie is an affiliated 
movie, and a value of 0 otherwise.  For example, for Entertainment 
Weekly, AFFILIATE has a value of 1 if the movie is distributed by a 
studio owned by Time Warner, and a value of 0 otherwise.  If media 
outlets are more likely to review films of affiliated studios then, all else 
equal, AFFILIATE should be positively correlated with whether a movie 
is reviewed.  
As noted above, bias in choosing which movies to review may 
take another form instead.  Reviewers may be more likely to review good 
160
 The major studios are those owned by The Walt Disney Company, Dreamworks 
L.L.C., Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., Paramount Plc, 
Sony Corporation, NBC Universal, Inc., and Time Warner Inc., with the exception of 
their niche film studios.  The niche studios of these companies are Miramax Zoe 
(Disney), Fox Searchlight (News Corp.), United Artists (MGM), Paramount Classics 
(Paramount), Screen Gems (Sony), Sony Pictures Classics (Sony), Universal Focus 
(Universal), Cinemax (Warner Brothers), Fine Line Features (Warner Brothers), and 
HBO (Warner Brothers).  Dana Harris, Hollywood Renews Niche Pitch, VARIETY, 
Apr. 7, 2003, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library.
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affiliated movies and less likely to review lower quality affiliated movies.  
This would allow a critic who wants to give sincere reviews to still be 
more likely to give positive reviews, and less likely to give negative 
reviews, to affiliated films.  To test for this alternative type of bias, two 
other explanatory variables are also used:  QUALITY and AFFILIATE x 
QUALITY.
Quality of Movie
As discussed above, QUALITY is the average grade given to the 
movie by unaffiliated reviewers, as reported in Variety’s Crix Picks.  It is 
calculated as the number of favorable reviews minus the number of 
unfavorable reviews, divided by the total number of reviews.  
Affiliation and Quality Interaction Term
An interaction term (AFFILIATE x QUALITY) equal to 
AFFILIATE multiplied by QUALITY is also included.  It is used to test 
whether media outlets are more likely to review a good affiliated movie 
than a good unaffiliated movie, and whether they are less likely to review 
a bad affiliated movie than a bad unaffiliated movie.  This interaction 
variable will be greater than zero for an affiliated movie that has generally 
received positive reviews, less than zero for an affiliated movie that has 
generally received negative reviews, and zero for an unaffiliated movie.  If 
reviewers are more likely to write reviews for good affiliated movies than 
for good unaffiliated movies, but less likely to write reviews for bad 
affiliated movies than for bad unaffiliated movies, then, all else equal, this 
interaction term should be positively correlated with whether a movie is 
reviewed.  
To test which of these variables help explain which movies are 
reviewed, the dependent variable REVIEW – whether a particular movie is 
reviewed – is regressed against these independent variables and an 
intercept term. This regression is conducted for each of the media outlets:  
Ebert & Roeper, Entertainment Weekly, and the New York Post.  Because 
the dependent variable (REVIEW) has only two possible values (i.e., a 
movie is either reviewed or not reviewed), logistic regressions are used.161
The results from these regressions are displayed in Table 5.  
161
 For a description of logistic regressions see G. S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT 
AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS 22-27 (1983).
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TABLE 5
Determinants of Decision to Review
Logit Estimates 
(p-values in parentheses)






  Ebert & Roeper  -0.1369 0.1241 *** -2.2573 *** -0.5477 * 0.6588 *** 0.0556 .3498
 (612 movies) (.5475) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.0739) (.0001) (.9121)
Ent. Weekly 1.405 *** 0.1707 *** -3.3278 *** 0.7261 0.5145 *** 1.0298 .4361
(776 movies) (.0006) (<.0001) (<.0001) (.2390) (.0033) (.2682)
N.Y. Post 0.4813 0.3856 *** -0.7186  Positive 0.0657 N/A .3624
 (1014 movies) (.3797) (<.0001) (.1700) (>.2500) (.7685) N/A
*       Statistically significant at the 10 percent level
**     Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
***   Statistically significant at the 1 percent level
As expected, the estimated coefficients of the #_REVIEWS 
variable are positive and statistically significant for all three media outlets.  
As noted, many of the same factors that lead unaffiliated critics to review a 
movie, such as pre-release publicity, should also cause affiliated critics to 
review it.  The results confirm that, all else equal, the more unaffiliated 
reviewers who review a certain movie, the more likely that a particular 
affiliated reviewer will review it also.  
Also, all three media outlets were less likely to review movies 
distributed by niche studios, which are represented by the NICHE variable.  
For Ebert & Roeper and Entertainment Weekly, this result was statistically 
significant.  As noted above, this result was not unexpected, because all 
three media outlets have wide intended audiences and thus may be less 
likely to review niche films than would other media outlets.
The estimated coefficients of the other explanatory variables 
indicate that there is not bias in the selection of movies to review, 
confirming the conclusions from Tables 2 and 3.  As the estimated 
coefficients of the AFFILIATE variable show, all else equal, none of the 
media outlets are significantly more likely to review affiliated movies than 
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unaffiliated movies.162  In fact, all else equal, Ebert & Roeper is actually 
less likely to review Disney movies than other movies.
In addition, as the estimated coefficients of the QUALITY variable 
demonstrate that, all else equal, all the media outlets are more likely to 
review higher quality movies than lesser quality movies.163  For Ebert & 
Roeper and Entertainment Weekly this result is statistically significant.  
However, as the estimated coefficient of the AFFILIATE x QUALITY 
interaction variable shows, none of the media outlets are significantly 
more likely to review higher quality affiliated movies than unaffiliated 
movies.164
The results for the New York Post require some additional 
explanation.  Because the New York Post reviewed all 56 movies 
distributed by News Corporation, there is quasi-complete separation of the 
data165 and thus the coefficient of the AFFILIATE variable cannot be 
estimated.  However, it can be determined that the coefficient is positive 
162
   Note that, because of the presence of the AFFILIATE x QUALITY interaction 
term in the regressions, the proper interpretation of the coefficient of AFFILIATE is 
the effect of affiliation on the dependent variable when QUALITY=0 (i.e., when a 
movie receives the same number of positive and negative reviews from unaffiliated 
reviewers).
163
  Because of the presence of the AFFILIATE x QUALITY interaction term in the 
regressions, the proper interpretation of the coefficient of QUALITY is the effect of 
movie quality on the dependent variable when AFFILIATE=0 (i.e., when the movie is 
reviewed by an unaffiliated reviewer).
164
 It is possible that a film’s genre (comedy, action, etc) may affect the probability 
that a movie is reviewed.  For example, if Entertainment Weekly’s enjoy action 
movies more than do readers of other publications, then Entertainment Weekly might 
be more likely to review an action movie than are other reviewers.  To control for this 
factor, the regressions were rerun including, as explanatory variables, dummy 
variables for the movies’ genres, as listed in the in the Internet Movie Database.  
However, controlling for genre did not markedly change any of the results.  The full 
logistic results when genre variables are included are available from the author.  
165
 Quasi-complete separation occurs when some linear function of the explanatory 
variables can perfectly predict one possible outcome of the dependent variable.  In 
this particular regression, one outcome of the dependent variable – a particular movie 
is not reviewed by the New York Post – can be fully explained by the AFFILIATE 
variable; all of the movies that are not reviewed by the New York Post were also not 
distributed by a News Corporation subsidiary.  See  Paul Allison, Convergence 
Problems in Logistic Regression, NUMERICAL ISSUES IN STATISTICAL COMPUTING 
FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST 238, 240-51 (Micah Altman et al. eds., 2004) (discussion 
of quasi-complete separation in logistic regressions and of methods for handling the 
problem).
39                                         VOL    :    
(i.e., greater than zero) and statistically insignificant.166  In addition, 
because of the quasi-complete separation, all the other estimated 
coefficients for that regression should be interpreted as the estimated 
coefficients for movies that are not distributed by News Corporation.167
Because of this interpretation, and because for the New York Post
regression the AFFILIATE x QUALITY interaction variable has a value 
of zero for all movies not distributed by a News Corporation subsidiary,168
the AFFILIATE x QUALITY variable is not included in the New York 
Post regression.
In summary, the empirical results presented in this section indicate 
that movie critics are not biased in selecting which movies to review.  All 
else equal, they are no more likely to review affiliated movies than 
unaffiliated movies in general, nor are they more likely to review higher 
quality affiliated movies than unaffiliated movies.  
     2.  Bias in the Review Itself
The second question this article examines is whether critics exhibit 
a bias in favor of affiliated movies in the grades they give to the movies.  
To help answer this question, Table 6 presents the percentage of reviews 
given by each media outlet that are favorable169 – broken down by the 
parent company of the studio distributing the movie.  To make a fair 
comparison, only those movies that were reviewed by all three outlets are 
included.  
Based on Table 6, critics do not appear to favor affiliated movies 
over unaffiliated movies.  For example, Ebert & Roeper is no more likely 
to give favorable reviews to Disney movies than are Entertainment Weekly
and the New York Post.  Similarly, Entertainment Weekly does not give 
better reviews to Time Warner movies than do the other media outlets, and 
166 Id. at 249.
167 Id. at 249. 
168
 Recall that AFFILIATE has a value of zero for all movies not distributed by a 
subsidiary of the critic’s parent company.  Thus AFFILIATE x QUALITY – the 
AFFILIATE variable multiplied by the QUALITY variable -- will also have a value 
of zero for such movies.
169
 Each media outlet uses a different rating system.  Ebert & Roeper gives a 
“Thumbs Up” (favorable review) or a “Thumbs Down” (unfavorable review).  
Entertainment Weekly gives a letter grade ranging from A to F; reviews giving at least 
a B- are generally favorable.  The New York Post gives a grade ranging from 4 stars to 
0 stars; reviews giving at least 2.5 stars are generally favorable.
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the New York Post does not give better reviews to News Corporation 
movies than do the other media outlets.  Indeed, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the percentage of reviews, given by the 
three media outlets to a particular distributor’s movies, that are 
favorable170
TABLE 6
















New York Post News Corp.
71.7% 48.0% 54.2%
Chi-squared = 4.76, Degrees of freedom=10   (Not Statistically Significant)
Although Table 6 suggests that no bias exists in the grades critics 
give to movies, further analysis is necessary to control for other factors 
that may be obscuring bias.  For example, Ebert & Roeper, Entertainment 
Weekly, and the New York Post each have multiple movie critics.  Thus, a 
logistic regression analysis is again used in which a number of
quantifiable, explanatory variables are examined that may affect the 
probability that a movie receives a particular grade from a particular critic.  
170
  The null hypothesis tested is that the percentage of reviews of a particular studio’s 
movies that are favorable is independent of the media outlet.  As noted in Table 6, this 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected because the chi square statistic is only 4.76, with 
10 degrees of freedom. 
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Quality of Movie
Recall that the variable QUALITY is the average grade given to a 
movie by reviewers with no affiliation to the studio that distributed it.  
Although critics often disagree about a movie’s merit, it is likely that, in 
general, the grade a particular critic gives a particular movie will be 
positively correlated with the grades that other critics give the movie.  
Thus, all else equal, the variable QUALITY should be positively 
correlated with the grade that a particular reviewer gives a movie.  
Affiliated Movie
As noted above, AFFILIATE is a binary dummy variable that 
denotes whether the film is distributed by a studio affiliated with the media 
outlet in which the review appears.  It has a value of 1 if it is an affiliated 
movie, and a value of 0 otherwise.  If critics are more likely to give 
favorable reviews to films of affiliated studios then, all else equal, 
AFFILIATE should be positively correlated with the grade that a critic 
gives a particular movie.
To test whether these variables help explain the grades critics give 
movies, the dependent variable GRADE – the grade a critic gives a 
particular movie – is regressed against these two independent variables 
and an intercept term.  This regression is conducted for each of the 
primary critics:  Roger Ebert and Richard Roeper of Ebert & Roeper; 
Owen Gleiberman and Lisa Schwarzbaum of Entertainment Weekly, and 
Jonathan Foreman and Lou Lumenick of the New York Post.  
Different critics use different grading systems.  Critics for 
Entertainment Weekly give movies letter grades ranging from A to F; 
critics for the New York Post give grades ranging from four stars to zero 
stars, in half-star increments.  Thus, because the dependent variable 
GRADE is an ordered, categorical variable an ordered logistic regression 
is used for the Entertainment Weekly and the New York Post reviewers.171
On the Ebert & Roeper television show, reviewers Roger Ebert and 
Richard Roeper give movies either a “Thumbs Up” (a positive review) or a 
“Thumbs Down” (a negative review).  Thus, because the dependent 
variable GRADE has only two possible values for them, 1 (for a positive 
review) or 0 (for a negative review), a simple logistic regression is used 
171
 The dependent variable, GRADE, is categorical because only certain values are 
possible (A, A-, etc. for Entertainment Weekly and  4 stars, 3.5 stars, etc. for the New 
York Post) and it is ordered because these categories are ordered (e.g., an A is a 
higher grade than an A-, which is higher than a B+, etc.).  
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for the Ebert and for Roeper. The regression results are presented in Table 
7.  
TABLE 7
Determinants of Review Grade





Roger Ebert 3.4571 *** 0.0268 .3245
(612 movies) (<.0001) (.9269)
Richard Roeper 1.9619 *** 0.5528 ** .1502
(567 movies) (<.0001) (.0400)
ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY
Owen Gleiberman  2.4320 *** -0.2757 .0922
(364 movies) (<.0001) (.2885)
Lisa Schwarzbaum 3.4371 *** -0.0718 .1513
(355 movies) (<.0001) (.7791)
NEW YORK POST
Jonathan Foreman    2.9108 *** 0.2010 .1478
(367 movies) (<.0001) (.6199)
Lou Lumenick    2.6960 *** 0.7199 ** .1261
(494 movies) (<.0001) (.0315)
*       Statistically significant at the 10 percent level
**     Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
***   Statistically significant at the 1 percent level
Table 7 supports the conclusion that, in general, critics are not 
biased in the grades they give movies.  Only four of the six critics 
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examined gave more favorable reviews to affiliated movies, and for only 
two of these critics, Richard Roeper and Lou Lumineck, was the result 
statistically significant.172 Taken as a whole, the six critics are not 
statistically significantly more likely to give a favorable review to an 
affiliated movie than to an unaffiliated movie.173 Unlike research analysts, 
critics do not exhibit a systematic bias in favor of affiliated movies.174
IV.  DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS
This article’s empirical analyses show that movie critics are not 
systematically biased in favor of affiliated movies, either in their selection 
of which movies to review or in the grades they give the movies.  Thus, 
movie critics working for the world’s largest media conglomerates appear 
to be passing on the opportunity to increase the profits of their 
conglomerates.  This is particularly interesting given the efforts, discussed 
above, of media conglomerates to use their subsidiaries to promote each 
other’s products.  
172 The regression results imply that there is a 48.1% probability that Roeper will give 
a favorable review to an unaffiliated movie that has received an equal number of 
favorable and unfavorable reviews from other critics, but a 61.7% probability that he 
will give a favorable review to a similar quality affiliated movie.  Also, the results 
imply that there is a 46.6% probability that Lumenick will give a favorable review to 
an unaffiliated movie that has received an equal number of favorable and unfavorable 
reviews from other critics, but a 64.2% probability that he will give a favorable 
review to a similar quality affiliated movie.  However, as a whole, critics are not 
statistically significantly more likely to give a favorable review to an affiliated movie.
173 The regression results obtained from using all six critics are available from the 
author.
174
 It is possible that a film’s genre (comedy, action, etc) may affect the grade that a 
particular critic gives a movie.  Critics may differ in the genres they prefer, and these 
preferences may be reflected in the grades they give to a particular studio’s movies.  
Thus, a critic might give higher ratings to affiliated movies because the affiliated 
studio makes more movies of genres that that critic prefers rather than because that 
critic is biased towards affiliated movies.  For example, if Roger Ebert likes romantic 
comedies more than other critics do, and if a greater percentage of Disney’s movies 
are romantic comedies than are other studios’ films, then, all else equal, he will give 
better reviews to Disney films, even if he is not biased in favor of Disney.  To control 
for this factor, the regressions were rerun including dummy variables for the movies’ 
genres, as listed in the in the Internet Movie Database.  However, controlling for 
genre did not markedly change any of the results.  The full logistic results when the 
genre variables are included are available from the author.  
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In addition, this finding also stands in stark contrast to the 
systematic bias of research analysts in favor of current and potential 
investment banking clients.  It also raises an important question:  why do 
some conflicts of interest (like those facing research analysts in large 
financial conglomerates) result in biased opinions and harm to consumers, 
while others (like those facing movie critics in large media conglomerates) 
do not?    Determining what factors account for this difference can provide 
insight what causes conflict of interests to actually cause bias and how 
regulators can reduce research analysts’ bias.  
One possible explanation for movie critics’ lack of bias may be 
that high-profile critics wish to protect their reputations for being 
unbiased; all of the critics examined in this paper work for large media 
outlets.  Research in many fields has demonstrated that the desire to 
protect a one’s reputation can cause a person to engage in behavior that is 
against that person’s short-term interest.175
There is evidence that movie critics of the stature examined in this 
article are aware of their reputations for being unbiased.  For example, 
Roger Ebert and Richard Roeper annually host a film festival on a Disney 
cruise and their attendance is highlighted in Walt Disney Cruise Line’s 
advertising of the cruise.176  When Ebert was asked by a reporter if he 
worried his attendance would create the appearance of a conflict of interest 
when he reviewed Disney movies, Ebert replied that he was not worried 
about such a perception because in his decades of reviewing movies he 
had developed a reputation for being unbiased.177 He noted, as an 
example, that he had given very negative reviews to two recent major 
Disney movies:  Pearl Harbor and The Princess Diaries.178  In addition, 
175 See, e.g., Daniel M. Covitz & Paul Harrison, Testing Conflicts of Interest at Bond 
Ratings Agencies with Market Anticipation: Evidence that Reputation Incentives 
Dominate, Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-68 
1 (2003), available at http:// www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200368/
200368pap.pdf (“rating changes do not appear to be importantly influenced by rating 
agency conflicts of interest, but, rather, suggest that rating agencies are motivated 
primarily by reputation-related incentives.”)
176
  Munoz, supra note 30, at F10.
177 Id.  Ebert also stated that before agreeing to host the festival, he and Roeper 
insisted that there be no pressure put on them to show Disney films at the festival.  In 
addition, to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest, both he and Roeper are not 
paid to host the film festival.  Jessica Shaw, All Thumbs on Deck, ENTERTAINMENT
WKLY., Mar. 14, 2003, at 40, available at 2003 WL 6557235.
178 Id.
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he argued that the importance of maintaining his reputation would prevent 
him from being biased:  “I have much more to lose than Disney has to 
gain. . . . If anybody perceives that I’m not telling the truth as I see it, I’m 
out of business.”179
 Other critics for major publications echo similar professionalism 
standards.  For example, Owen Gleiberman, a critic for Entertainment 
Weekly – and one of the critics examined in this paper – has complained 
that “[t]oo many puff critics, quote whores . . . and bland, lily-livered 
critics are drowning out the serious critics.”180
However, reputation concerns are likely not largely responsible for 
the lack of bias found in this Article.  First, bias would be very difficult for 
moviegoers to detect for a number of reasons.  As noted above, it is very 
unlikely that moviegoers know whether a particular movie’s distributor 
and the critic’s media outlet have the same parent company.  In addition, 
because each studio distributes only a fraction of the movies released, the 
vast majority of a critic’s reviews would be unaffected by bias.181  For 
these reasons, it is very unlikely that a bias toward affiliated movies would 
be detected, absent the types of empirical analyses used in this Article.  
The bias would affect only a small percentage of the critic’s reviews and 
because the public is unaware of which movies are affiliated with a 
particular critic, the public would not be aware that it was bias in favor of 
affiliated movies.
In addition, reputation concerns by critics would be unable to 
prevent unintentional bias.  At most law schools, professors grade exams 
blind – i.e., without knowing who wrote the exam – in part to avoid 
unintentional bias in grading.182  Similarly, a critic may subconsciously 
look more favorably on a movie because it is distributed by an affiliated 
studio.  
Finally, the fact that similar reputation concerns did not prevent 
bias in research analysts, also suggests that reputation concerns would not 
be sufficient to prevent bias in movie critics.  Research analysts’ bias 
occurred despite the fact that analysts’ reputations for providing accurate 
179 Id.
180
 Shaw, supra note 31, at A1.
181
 For example, Time Warner studios distributed only 11.4% of the movies examined 
in this paper, the most of any parent company.
182 Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race From Legal Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 51, 69 (1994).
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forecasts can be important to their success.183  In addition, the accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts can be objectively measured, unlike the accuracy of 
movie reviews.  If a research analyst recommends a particular stock or 
issues an estimate of a company’s quarterly earnings, then it will be clear 
in hindsight whether the analyst was correct, and his or her reputation 
could be affected accordingly.  In contrast, a critic’s judgment regarding 
the quality of a particular movie is inherently subjective, so although a 
critic might be hold a minority view regarding certain movies, one cannot 
objectively conclude that the critic was inaccurate.
The primary explanations for the differences in bias exhibited by 
movie critics and research analysts are differences in the structures of the 
organizations in which they work, and differences in the financial 
incentives that they face.  These differences also suggest that many of the 
recent reforms targeted at research analysts are likely to be successful in 
reducing analysts’ bias.  
As discussed above, these reforms fall into three categories:  (1) 
reforms designed to make research analysts independent, especially from 
their firms’ investment bankers; (2) reforms designed to eliminate research 
analysts’ financial interest in the effect of their reports on the companies 
they cover; and (3) reforms that require disclosure of research analysts’ 
conflicts of interest.  This article’s empirical analyses suggest that the first 
two sets of reforms are likely to be successful, but the disclosure 
requirements are unnecessary.
Increasing Research Analysts’ Independence
The first type of reform is directed at increasing research analysts’ 
independence, especially from their firms’ investment bankers.  As 
discussed above, research analysts gave more favorable coverage to 
companies with which their employer had or hoped to secure investment 
banking business.  This is unsurprising in light of the pressure on these 
research analysts to write positive reports about such companies.  For 
example, companies threatened to end lucrative investment banking 
relationships with the employers of research analysts who wrote 
183
 Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and 
Biased Earnings Forecasts, 58 J. FIN. 313 (2003) (empirical study finding that 
forecasting accuracy affects research analysts’ career success).   Hong and Kubik’s 
study also found that for stocks underwritten by analysts’ employers, forecasting 
accuracy has less impact -- and optimism in the forecasts has a greater impact -- on 
career advancement.  This demonstrates that the conflicts of interest can outweigh an 
analyst’s concern for having a reputation of being an accurate forecaster.  Id.
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unfavorable reports about them.184  Sometimes these threats resulted in 
research analysts being removed from covering the complaining 
company.185
There were also other sources of pressure to produce biased 
recommendations. Research analysts often worked under the supervision 
of the investment banking department.186  In addition, some research 
analysts’ compensation was directly based in part on the investment 
banking business that they helped bring in.187  In fact, investment banking 
departments’ pitches for business from a company sometimes included a 
promise that a particularly well known research analyst at the investment 
bank’s firm would cover the company’s stock.188  Sometimes the research 
analyst would even attend these pitches.189
The situation is very different for movie critics working for media 
conglomerates.  There is no evidence that these critics or their parent 
companies view part of the critics’ jobs as the promotion of affiliated 
movies.  Also, critics’ supervisors are editors of the media outlet for which 
they work, not executives of affiliated studios.190  In addition, critics’ 
compensation is not based on how affiliated movies perform at the box 
office.191  For all these reasons, critics do not face the great pressure to 
184 See, e.g., Jeremy Kahn, Frank Quattrone’s Heavy Hand, FORTUNE, Dec. 30, 2002, 
at 78, available at 2002 WL 101716118 (the Chief Executive Officer of EarthLink 
threatened to move Earthlink’s investment banking business from Credit Suisse First 
Boston (CSFB) because of CSFB’s research reports on Earthlink).
185 Id.    
186 See, e.g., Landon Thomas Jr., U.S. Accuses a Top Banker of Obstruction, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library (while he was global 
head of technology banking for Credit Suisse First Boston, Frank Quattrone also had 
“direct control over his research analysts”).
187
 Smith, supra note 57; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 3.
188 See also Marion Webb, New Rules enacted for Wall Street brokerage firms: 
analysts’ conduct raises regulators’ eyebrows, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at 
15, available at 2002 WL 13652566 (quoting an Ernst & Young partner as saying that 
“[c]ompanies pick the investment bankers based upon their comfort with the research 
analyst, and expectation that the research analyst will provide favorable coverage –
but there isn’t a formal guarantee for it”).
189
 Smith, supra note 57.
190
  Telephone Interview with Dann Gire, supra note 49.  
191 Id.
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give favorable reviews to affiliated movies that research analysts felt to 
give favorable coverage to actual or potential investment banking clients.
This contrast between research analysts and movie critics also 
indicates the importance of an individual having a personal stake in the 
creation of bias for a conflict of interest to result in actual bias.  This 
Article’s findings indicate that, to create bias, it is not enough that that 
individual’s parent company benefits from bias; instead the bias must also 
benefit the individual research analyst or critic personally.  Research 
analysts who gave negative coverage to investment banking clients risk 
reducing their own compensation.  However, movie critics who give 
unfavorable reviews to affiliated movies face no such sanctions.  The 
result of these differing incentives appears to be that stock 
recommendations are often biased but movie reviews are not.  This 
strongly suggests that reforms that increase research analysts’ 
independence from investment bankers should reduce bias in research 
analysts’ reports.
Eliminating Research Analysts’ Stake in How Their Reports 
Affect the Companies They Cover
Another way that research analysts can have a personal financial 
stake is by actually owning a financial interest in the companies they 
cover.  Obviously, a research analyst with a financial stake in a company 
the analyst covers will have a conflict of interest.  For example, if the 
analyst owns stock in a company, the analyst will have a direct personal 
financial incentive to not issue a negative report on the company because 
the report may adversely affect the value of the analyst’s stockholding.192
Thus, the second type of reform is directed at eliminating research 
analysts’ personal financial interest in how their coverage affects the 
companies they cover.  As discussed above, these reforms consist of rules 
limiting the types and timing of transactions that analysts can make in the 
securities of the companies they cover.  
The article’s finding of little evidence of bias by movie critics 
suggests that these reforms are also warranted.  Unlike some research 
analysts, movie critics do not have direct financial interests in the movies 
they review.  Some critics are involved in the production of particular 
movies, but these critics do not review movies with which they were 
involved.193  For example, the Ethics Policy of the Chicago Film Critics 
192
 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 3.
193
 Telephone Interview with Dann Gire, supra note 49.  
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Association explicitly prohibits critics from “participating (regardless of 
compensation) in productions that will be reviewed by the critic.”194
The importance of having a personal financial stake in the creation 
of bias is further illustrated by the effect of press junkets on some movie 
critics.  As discussed above, studios give many critics who attend these 
junkets free airfare, expensive hotel rooms and meals, spending money, 
and access to movie stars.  In addition, studios have sometimes 
temporarily blackballed critics who were harshly critical of the studios’ 
movies.195  As discussed above, there is at least strong anecdotal evidence 
that some regular junket attendees respond to these incentives by making 
very positive statements about the movies shown at the junkets.196
Regular junket attendees often provide the positive blurbs that appear in 
advertising about movies that received widespread poor reviews.197
The behavior of some junket attendees provides more support for 
the conclusion that preventing critics from having a personal financial 
interest in the creation of bias is a key to preventing bias.  Similarly, it 
indicates that eliminating research analysts’ personal financial stake in 
how their reports affect the companies they cover is a key to eliminating 
bias in their reports.  
Disclosure Requirements
This final type of recent reform requires the public disclosure of 
the conflicts of interests that research analysts face.  Disclosure 
requirements may serve two purposes.  First, disclosure may make it less 
likely that investors will rely upon biased reports.  Disclosure alerts 
investors to a research analyst’s conflict of interests so that they may view 
the analyst’s report with more skepticism.198  Second, because investors 
will be aware of the conflicts, disclosure may encourage research analysts
194
 Ethics Policy of the Chicago Film Critics Association (on file with the author).
195 See supra p. 11.
196 Roger Ebert, supra note 49, at 35 (“How do you qualify as a quote whore? You 
give good quote. Freebie junketeers sometimes scribble down words of praise and 
pass them to publicists right at the junket.”)
197
 Welkos & Abramowitz, supra, note 45. 
198 Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein, Don A. Moore. The Dirt on Coming 
Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD 
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 6, on file with author).
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to not be biased, because their recommendations and forecasts will be 
viewed more suspiciously.199
However, this article’s results indicate that the disclosure 
requirements are unnecessary.  As noted above, movie critics do not 
disclose when they are reviewing a movie distributed by a studio with 
which they are affiliated.  Despite this lack of disclosure, movie critics do 
not show systematic bias toward affiliated movies.  Because critics work 
independently from those who distribute the affiliated movies, and because 
critics lack a personal financial interest in the success of affiliated movies, 
they do not exhibit the bias displayed by research analysts.  Thus no 
disclosure of movie critics’ conflicts of interests appears necessary.  
This also suggests that requiring research analysts to disclose their 
conflicts of interest would be unnecessary if the other reforms are 
successful in keeping analysts independent from their firms’ investment 
bankers and in keeping analysts from having a personal stake in how their 
coverage affects the companies they cover.  
This conclusion is especially important because other research has 
shown that disclosure may have unintended, undesirable effects.200  One 
such effect is that, if forced to disclose their conflicts of interest, research 
analysts may react strategically by making forecasts and recommendations 
exhibiting even greater bias.201  For example, if an analyst believes that 
disclosure of the firm’s investment banking relationship will cause 
investors to discount the analysts’ recommendation to purchase a 
particular stock, the analyst might intentionally give an even more 
exaggerated recommendation to offset this discounting.  In other words, 
“[w]hile disclosure might warn an audience to cover its ears, it may also 
encourage advisors to yell even louder.”202
In addition, disclosure might increase bias by making some 
research analysts feel that disclosure gives them an ethical green light to 
give biased advice.203  An analyst may believe that because disclosure 
199 Id. (manuscript at 7).
200 These potential undesirable effects, and the psychological studies underpinning 
them, are thoroughly discussed in Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein, Don A. 
Moore, Coming Clean but Playing Dirty: The Shortcomings of Disclosure as a 
Solution to Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2005). 
201 Cain et al., supra note 198, (manuscript at 7-8).
202 Cain et al., supra note 200, (manuscript at 16).
203 Id. (manuscript at 16-17).
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warns investors to beware of bias, the analyst is relieved of the ethical 
responsibility of being unbiased.  The results of some psychology 
experiments indicate that this concern is justified.204
A related problem of disclosure is that it may reduce the likelihood 
that policy-makers take other steps to actually reduce or eliminate the 
existence of the conflict of interest.  Because disclosure warns consumers 
of advice to be wary of the advice, disclosure may be perceived as 
reducing policy-makers’ responsibility for any harm resulting from the 
conflict, and thus may lessen the political pressure on policymakers to 
reduce or eliminate the conflict of interest.205
In addition, investors may not react to the disclosure in the way 
that the SEC intends them to.  For example, if analysts disclose their 
conflicts of interest, the act of disclosure might be perceived as evidence 
that the analysts are being honest, and thus might lead to even greater 
reliance on the conflicted analysts’ forecasts and recommendations.206
Also, even if investors do react to disclosure by being more 
skeptical of conflicted analyst’s advice, for several reasons investors are 
very unlikely to discount sufficiently that conflicted advice.  First, there is 
no reason to believe that investors are aware of the amount by which 
conflicted research analysts’ forecasts should be discounted.  In fact, 
psychological research indicates that people are likely to underestimate the 
bias resulting from conflicts of interest.207  Second, other psychological 
204
 Benoit Monin & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of 
Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 33 (2001) (persons who were given 
the opportunity to show to they are not prejudiced were more likely to subsequently 
take actions that are prejudiced ); D.G. Dutton & R.A. Lake, Threat of Own Prejudice 
and Reverse Discrimination in Interracial Situations, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 94 (1973) (persons who were falsely told that they had exhibited a racist 
reaction to a particular stimulus were more likely to subsequently take actions to 
demonstrate that they are not racist).  
205
 Cain et al., supra note 200, (manuscript at 7).
206
  Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Corresondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 21, 21 (1995) (“Three decades of research in social psychology have shown 
that many of the mistakes people make are of a kind:  When people observe behavior, 
they often conclude that the person who performed the behavior was predisposed to
do so – that the person’s behavior corresponds to the person’s unique dispositions –
and they draw such conclusions even when a logical analysis suggests they should 
not.”).
207 See Cain et al., supra note 200 at 14-15 and the studies cited therein (“Estimating 
the extent to which advice has been biased by an advisor’s conflict of interest 
necessitates estimating the effect of a situational inducement on behavior; and such 
situational effects generally tend to be underestimated”).
52                                         VOL    :    
experiments have long demonstrated that because of an “anchoring and 
insufficient adjustment effect,” people will give too much weight to 
advice, even if it is disclosed to them that the advice is randomly 
generated.208  In addition, other experiments have demonstrated the 
“failure of evidentiary discreditation”:  people have difficulty disregarding 
information (such as stock forecasts that they have seen), even if they 
learn that the information is inaccurate.209
The combination of disclosure requirements causing analysts’ 
research reports possibly to be even more biased, and investors being 
unable to sufficiently discount the research reports for this bias, means that 
investors might even be made worse off by disclosure requirements.  
Indeed, a recent experiment found that when forced to disclose their 
conflict of interest, conflicted advisors’ advice was much more biased than 
when they did not have to disclose their conflict.210  Although the 
receivers of the advice discounted the advice in response to the disclosure, 
they did so insufficiently.211  As a result, overall, the receivers of the 
advice were worse off than if disclosure of the conflict had not been 
given.212
These possible adverse effects of disclosure support the conclusion 
that the reforms directed at research analysts should focus on reducing 
their conflicts of interest rather than on mandating the disclosure of the 
conflicts.213
208
 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and 
biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124-1131 (1974).
209
 Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental 
Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 117 (1994).
210
 The experiment involved persons (“estimators”) who had to guess from a distance 
the amount of money that was in a jar of coins.  They received advice from other 
persons (“advisors”) who were given the opportunity to more closely study the jar.  
However, the advisors had a conflict of interest because the higher the estimators 
guessed, the more compensation the advisors received.  Cain et al., supra note 198 
(manuscript at 10-12).
211 Id. (manuscript at 15-16).
212 Id. (manuscript at 16).
213 Cain et al., supra note 200 (manuscript at 15) (“In sum, a substantial body of 
research suggests that it is unlikely that [receivers of advice] will be able to use 
disclosures of conflict of interest to correctly discount advice from biased sources, 
even if those disclosures are honest and thorough”).
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V.  CONCLUSION
Conglomerates have the opportunity to exploit synergies between 
their businesses to offer better products or services or lower prices.  
However, they also can create conflicts of interests for their employees.  
This article has examined two industries in which certain professionals 
face similar conflicts of interests because of the conglomerates in which 
they work.  
Millions of investors rely on the sincere investment advice 
research analysts who work in brokerages.  However, those research 
analysts whose employer is part of financial institutions with that also 
have investment banking divisions face a conflict of interest because 
giving positive recommendations regarding particular stocks can help the 
financial institution secure lucrative investment banking business. 
Similarly, millions of consumers rely on movie critics for sincere 
advice regarding which movies to see.  However, those movie critics 
whose employers are part of media conglomerates that also own movie 
studios have a conflict of interest because giving positive reviews of those 
studios’ movies can cause more people to see the movies.  
Despite the similarities in the conflicts of interest facing these two 
sets of professions, they have responded very differently to the conflicts.  
Previous research and litigation has demonstrated that research analysts’ 
reports have been biased by their conflict of interest.  However, this 
Article’s empirical analyses have found no systematic bias in movie 
critics’ reviews.
The difference can be attributed to the fact that the organizational 
structure and financial incentives facing movie critics differ significantly 
from those that faced many research analysts. These critics are not 
supervised by studio executives, nor do critics personally profit from how 
much money their reviews make for affiliated studios.  On the other hand, 
many research analysts were being supervised by their firms’ investment 
bankers, compensated partly upon how much investment banking business 
they helped bring in, and were able to personally financially benefit from 
how their reports affected the prices of the securities they covered.
The Article’s findings provide guidance for policymakers tasked 
with controlling conflicts of interest.  Their focus should be on reducing 
the existence of the conflicts of interests, not on publicly disclosing them.  
This conclusion is especially important given recent research showing that, 
at least in some contexts, disclosure can harm those it is intended to 
protect.
This conclusion also speaks favorably of many of the rules and 
regulations the Securities Exchange Commission and others have recently 
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imposed on research analysts and their employers. Because many of the 
recent reforms will make the organizational structure and financial 
incentives of research analysts’ more like those of movie critics, this 
article provides support for the conclusion that such reforms will likely 
reduce analysts’ bias.  However, it also suggests that the reforms that 
mandate public disclosure of the analysts’ conflicts of interests are 
unnecessary.  Movie reviews do not disclose when the critic is reviewing 
an affiliated movie, yet these reviews are still not biased.
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